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ARTICLE
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IMPLICATIONS OF
SHARIA IMPLEMENTATION IN
ACEH, INDONESIA
ASMA T. UDDIN*
INTRODUCTION
On Monday, September 14, 2009, the provincial legislature in Aceh,
Indonesia passed Sharia regulations imposing stringent criminal punish-
ments for various sexual offenses, such as adultery and fornication.1 Sharia,
literally meaning “way to a watering place,” is a set of divine principles that
regulate a Muslim’s relationship with God and man by providing social,
moral, religious, and legal guidance. It is implemented through fiqh, or Is-
lamic jurisprudence, which is the science of interpreting religious texts in
order to deduce legal rulings. The Acehnese Sharia regulations are the latest
manifestations of a process of formal implementation of Sharia that began
in 2002 in Aceh.2 Given the gravity of the associated punishments, the reg-
ulations have caught national and international attention, with human rights
activists across the world decrying the severity of the corporal punishments
imposed by the regulations. Much less frequently scrutinized are the regula-
tions’ implications for other human rights—such as religious freedom.
This paper analyzes these regulations’ religious freedom implications
for both Muslims and non-Muslims. Part I begins with an introduction to
the religious freedom climate in Indonesia, including an overview of inter-
national and domestic religious freedom law and the extent to which Indo-
nesia conforms to that law. Part II focuses on Aceh: its history and special
* Asma T. Uddin is the International Legal Fellow at the Becket Fund for Religious Lib-
erty.  I owe special thanks to Marie Connelly, Summer 2010 Intern at the Becket Fund, for her
excellent research assistance and absolute devotion to the project. I would also like to thank the
University of St. Thomas Law Journal staff for all their work on this article. Minor portions of this
article appeared in documents prepared for use by the Becket Fund, and are used with permission.
1. Katie Hamann, Aceh Province Legislators Vote to Impose Stricter Sharia Law, VOICE OF
AM., Sept. 15, 2009, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-09-15-voa9-68709782.
html.
2. Karishma Vaswani, On Patrol with Aceh’s Sharia Police, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/8491195.stm (last updated Feb. 2, 2010).
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character, including its semi-autonomy from the national government, and
the process of Sharia implementation in the region. Finally, Part III ana-
lyzes Acehnese Sharia regulations in relation to international and domestic
religious freedom law and explores the connection between the national
state of religious freedom and the religious freedom problems unique to
Aceh. Part III also raises broader questions of whether Sharia can ever be
translated into positive law without implicating religious freedom. This pa-
per concludes that Sharia regulations, insofar as they require the implemen-
tation of one interpretation of Islam to the exclusion of other interpretations,
pose serious intra-Muslim religious freedom problems, particularly in the
context of the modern nation-state, which lacks the types of checks on exec-
utive power that existed in classical Islam. Sharia implementation in the
modern framework leads to the politicization of Islam; instead of the state
serving Islam, Islam is manipulated to serve the state.
I. INDONESIA’S RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CLIMATE
A. History of Islam’s Spread in Indonesia
Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world.3 Indonesia
has numerous ethnic groups, and while ninety percent of Indonesians are
Muslims, the remaining ten percent belong to a wide variety of faiths.4
Even the Muslim majority is internally diverse, colored by varying ethnic
and native religious practices.
When Islam first arrived in Indonesia in the thirteenth century, it
helped integrate disparate groups of people into a single culture.5 It spread
gradually and peacefully—and quite successfully—precisely because it ac-
commodated existing cultures and faith traditions.6 This process of Islam’s
spread falls into three distinct phases: acculturation, purification of accul-
turated Islam, and modern Islamization, or Islamization of the government
and society.7
From the arrival of Islam in the fourteenth century through the early
nineteenth century, Indonesia was in the acculturation phase—characterized
by integrating Islam with indigenous custom. In the Java province, accultur-
ation was evident among Indonesia’s largest ethnic group, the Javanese,
where “there were ongoing processes of both Islamization of Javanese and
3. Indonesia Country Profile, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/country_profiles/1260
544.stm (last updated Sept. 5, 2010).
4. Brian Padden, Tensions Test Indonesia’s Moderate Muslim Image, VOICE OF AM., Aug.
2, 2010, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/Tensions-Test-Indonesias-Moderate-Mus-
lim-Image-99757334.html.
5. Joko Mirwan Muslimin, Islamic Law and Social Change: A Comparative Study of the
Institutionalization and Codification of Islamic Family Law in the Nation-States Egypt and Indo-
nesia (1950–1995) 97 (Feb. 2, 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hamburg) (on
file with author).
6. Id. at 123.
7. Id. at 97, 102, 133.
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Javanization of Muslims.”8 The Javanese language, instead of Arabic, was
used to teach crucial concepts of orthodox Islamic mysticism.9 Reflections
of such melding are easily observable even today.10 For example, mosque
architecture incorporates local style, elements of native ceremonies—such
as rhythmic drumming—often precede the Muslim call to prayer, and some
Islamic groups even drink traditionally made wine as part of their celebra-
tions, despite clear Quranic injunctions against the consumption of
alcohol.11
During the four-century-long acculturation phase, Indonesia coexisted
peacefully with the colonial forces of Portugal, Spain, and Britain. Yet in
the 1830s, tensions between Indonesian Muslims and Dutch colonial forces
marked the beginning of the second phase of Islamization: purification of
accultured Islam. Indonesian Muslims sought to implement Sharia-based
reforms while Dutch colonists attempted to establish colonial rules. A stark
contrast between pious and acculturated Muslims also became apparent. In
the Java province, nominal Muslims abandoned the five pillars of Islam,
some converting to different faiths. Reformist Muslims, many returning
from Meccan pilgrimages, wanted a “comprehensive and radical reform of
Islam.”12 These reformers saw the melding of Islam with indigenous cul-
tural practices as heretical and harmful to the spread of fundamental tenets
of Islam. The target of reform was to eliminate the “mystic synthesis” of
indigenous culture and Islam, and to educate Muslims “who nominally al-
ready subscribed to the worldview of Islam, so they would become true
Muslims with a more precise and righteous orthodoxy.”13
The conflict among Dutch colonists, nominal Muslims, recent con-
verts, and reformist Muslims triggered a civil war. The reformers lost the
war but have not given up their fight.14 Reformist Muslims persist in their
efforts to Islamize Indonesia, which has brought the country into the third
and current phase of Islamization: Modern Islamization. This current phase
seeks to spread Islam from above, through the government, and from be-
low, through society.
Modern Islamization is divided into three periods. The first, focusing
exclusively on Islamizing the government, lasted from the 1930s, shortly
before Indonesian independence, through the “political consolidation of the
New Order regime in 1968.”15 The second period focused exclusively on
8. ARSKAL SALIM, CHALLENGING THE SECULAR STATE 46–47 (2008) [hereinafter SALIM,
SECULAR STATE].
9. Id. at 47.
10. Michael Finkel, Facing Down the Fanatics, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Oct. 2009, at 76, avail-
able at http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2009/10/indonesia/finkel-text/1.
11. Id.
12. SALIM, SECULAR STATE, supra note 8, at 47.
13. Id. at 48.
14. Id. at 47.
15. Id. at 49.
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Islamizing society and lasted until the fall of the New Order regime in
1998. The third period, currently ongoing, is focusing on Islamizing both
the government and society.
The most significant attempt to Islamize the government was the
Jakarta Charter of the Indonesian Constitution. In 1945, anticipating Indo-
nesian independence, the Japanese occupation organized Indonesian groups
to draft a constitution for the soon-to-be formed Indonesian state.16 During
these meetings, the first Indonesian president, Sukarno,17 proposed Pan-
casila, a five-part philosophy he introduced to drive the formation of a plu-
ralistic Indonesia. Pancasila, whose five tenets are belief in one supreme
God, just and civilized humanity, nationalism, democracy, and social jus-
tice, was the source of much debate between two influential groups: the
secular Nationalists and devout Islamists.18 Nationalists sought to establish
a national identity distinct from Western imperialism while devout Islamists
sought to revive orthodox Islam.19
During a preliminary meeting on June 22, 1945, the Committee of
Nine, consisting of five nationalists and four devout Islamists, met to draft
an Indonesian Constitution.20 They produced the Jakarta Charter, which ad-
ded seven key words to the first tenet of Pancasila, Belief in One God:
dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya
(with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic Sharia).21 The
Jakarta Charter contained this language of compromise in the preamble, the
article on religion, and the religious qualification for the president—he
must be Muslim.22 With this compromise, the Nationalists believed that
Indonesia would not be an Islamic state and the Islamists believed that, at a
minimum, Sharia would be obligatory for Muslim citizens.23 Sharia, based
on tradition and the sacred text of the Quran, is the way of life for followers
of Islam and includes principles of civil and criminal justice as well as
personal and moral norms. Part II includes a more detailed explanation of
Sharia.
16. Koichi Kawamura, Politics of the 1945 Constitution: Democratization and Its Impact on
Political Institutions in Indonesia 4 (Inst. of Developing Econ., Res. Paper No. 3, 2003), available
at http://ir.ide.go.jp/dspace/bitstream/2344/811/1/ARRIDE_ResearchPapers_No.3_kawamura.pdf.
17. Like many Indonesians, Sukarno has only one name.
18. SALIM, SECULAR STATE, supra note 8, at glossary 223.
19. Id. at 51.
20. Id. at 63–64. The nationalists in attendance were Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, A.A.
Maramis, Achmad Subardjo, and Muhammad Yamin. The participating Islamists were Abikusno
Tjokrosuyoso, Agus Salmi, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, and Wahid Hasjim.
21. Id. at 64.
22. UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR REPUBLIK INDONESIA [CONSTITUTION] 1945, art. 29 (Indon.).
23. SALIM, SECULAR STATE, supra note 8, at 64; Anthony L. Smith, Indonesia: One State,
Many States, Chaotic State? 10 (Inst. of Se. Asian Studies Working Papers, Int’l Pol. & Sec.
Issues No. 1, 2001), available at http://web.iseas.edu.sg/ipsi12001.pdf.
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The Jakarta Charter was not ratified. Sukarno rejected the idea of hav-
ing an official state religion.24 Himself a child of an interfaith marriage—
his mother was Hindu and his father Muslim—Sukarno feared that estab-
lishing a national religion would alienate minority religious groups in Indo-
nesia.25 Sukarno not only feared that Indonesia’s Christian regions and
islands would refuse to join the Republic if the Charter were included, but
he also knew that the majority of Indonesians, generally lax in their relig-
ious observance, were against making Islam the official religion of the
state.26 This became evident on August 18, 1945, the day after Indonesia
declared independence; Christians in the eastern islands threatened to se-
cede from the archipelago should the seven words of the Jakarta Charter be
retained.27
Other groups opposed the Jakarta Charter because of its religious free-
dom implications. The seven words were vague and ambiguous, making it
unclear how they would be interpreted. The problem of legal dualism was
also present. To what degree would Sharia govern Muslims, particularly if
there was a conflict with customary law? The religious freedom implica-
tions of implementing Sharia in the Aceh Province will be addressed in Part
III.
In 1966, Indonesia’s second president, Suharto, took power in the af-
termath of anti-communist violence that killed half a million Indonesians.28
He sought to end hostilities by instituting a militarized regime, which he
coined the “New Order,” in contrast with that of his predecessor, Sukarno.29
Suharto’s regime saw the rise and fall of the second period of the modern
phase of Islamization: influencing society. Shortly after taking power,
Suharto “suspended all discussions regarding the Jakarta Charter, . . . forced
all Islamic political parties to be fused into a single party, . . . and imposed
Pancasila to replace Islam as the sole ideological basis of all political par-
ties.”30 Reformist Muslims who had hope of Islamizing Indonesia from
above by passing laws and electing leaders to advance Islamic ideals were
forced to achieve their goals from below by embedding Islamic culture and
values in society.31 In 1998, a student-led, pro-democracy movement—con-
sisting of a few million people, mostly Muslims—triggered Suharto’s resig-
nation and the collapse of the second period of Modern Islamization.32
24. THE BROWN REFERENCE GROUP PLC, WORLD AND ITS PEOPLES: INDONESIA AND EAST
TIMOR 1360 (2008) [hereinafter PEOPLES].
25. Finkel, supra note 10, at 7.
26. PEOPLES, supra note 24, at 1360.
27. SALIM, SECULAR STATE, supra note 8, at 69.
28. Suharto, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2008, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestop-
ics/people/s/_suharto/index.html.
29. SALIM, SECULAR STATE, supra note 8, at 49.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Suharto’s Resignation, British Council, http://www.britishcouncil.org/learnenglish-
central-history-suharto.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2010).
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The end of Suharto’s regime exacerbated a pre-existing divide in the
Muslim community between those who wanted to continue Indonesia’s
blending of cultures and ethnicities, and those who wanted to “purify” Is-
lam from local customs and beliefs.33 Islamic reformers wanting to purify
Islam have sought to concurrently Islamize the government and society.
That divide has been widened further by the infiltration of Indonesian soci-
ety by literalist Wahhabi ideas and practices originating in Saudi Arabia,
which fund numerous schools and Islamic universities in Indonesia.34
This rise in radicalism—that is, this increasing push to “purify” Islam
and society according to a literalist understanding of the faith—during the
past two decades is increasingly leading to religious tensions. A legal
framework that recognizes only six religions as valid, requires that individ-
uals register their religion with the government, limits religious expression
through blasphemy laws, and bans proselytizing further worsens these ten-
sions.35 The following Part explores the tension that exists between these
problematic laws and the international and constitutional requirements to
respect religious freedom.
B. International Religious Freedom Law Applicable to Indonesia
Indonesia has committed to religious freedom in six international in-
struments: the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), the Vienna Convention, the Association of South East Asian Na-
tions Charter (ASEAN), and the Indonesian Human Rights Act of 1999.36
As a member of the United Nations, Indonesia has pledged to respect
the principles set forth in the United Nations Charter, which commits mem-
ber nations to “respect . . . human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”37 Indonesia has
also pledged to uphold the UDHR,38 which states, in Article 18: “Everyone
has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right in-
cludes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or
33. Noorhaidi Hasan, Reformasi, Religious Diversity, and Islamic Radicalism After Suharto,
1 J. INDON. SOC. SCI. & HUMAN., 23–51 (2008), available at http://www.kitlv-journals.nl/index.
php/jissh/article/viewFile/URN:NBN:NL:UI:10-1-100073/4392.
34. GIORA ELIRAZ, ISLAM IN INDONESIA: MODERNISM, RADICALISM, AND THE MIDDLE EAST
DIMENSION 39–40 (2004).
35. The six official religions in Indonesia are Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism,
Buddhism, and Confucianism. NADIRSYAH HOSEN, SHARI’A & CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN INDO-
NESIA 195 (2007).
36. Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 4–6, RE: Request for Judicial Review of Act No. 1/PNPS/1965 on the Prevention of Mistreat-
ment of Religion and/or Blasphemy Under the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia,
140/PUU-VII/2009 (Const. Ct. of the Republic of Indon.).
37. U.N. Charter art. 55.
38. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
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in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion
or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”39
Moreover, Indonesia is obligated to protect religious liberty under the
ICCPR,40 which Indonesia ratified in 2005.41 The ICCPR is the legal ex-
pression of the principles outlined in the UDHR and unequivocally protects
an individual’s rights to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion,42
freedom of association,43 and equal protection under the law44—rights that
the ICCPR specifically extends to religious minorities.45
The ICCPR also protects free expression. There are limitations on free
expression premised on the rights of other persons or the community. How-
ever, the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 10, which in-
terprets ICCPR Article 19, emphasizes that these restrictions “may not put
in jeopardy the right itself.”46
39. Id. art. 18.
40. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2200(XXI), art. 18 (Dec. 16, 1966).
41. See Council on Foundations, Country Information: Indonesia, U.S. INT’L GRANTMAKING
(Nov. 2010), http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/indonesia.asp (explaining that the ICCPR was rati-
fied in Indonesia through the enactment of Law No. 12/2005 on October 28, 2005).
42. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 40, art. 18 (“1. Everyone
shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include free-
dom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship,
observance, practice and teaching. 2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 3. Freedom to manifest one’s
religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are neces-
sary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others.”).
43. Id. art. 21 (“The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be
placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public
order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.”).
44. Id. art. 26 (“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimina-
tion to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, prop-
erty, birth or other status.”).
45. Id. art. 27 (“In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, per-
sons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to
use their own language.”).
46. Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Human Rights Comm., General
Comment No. 10: Freedom of Expression (Art. 19), ¶ 4 (Jun. 29, 1983), available at http://www2.
ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/comments.htm (follow “Article 19 (Freedom of opinion)” hyper-
link). The Human Rights Committee that issues General Comments is a body of independent
experts that monitors implementation of the ICCPR. The Committee is empowered to hear indi-
vidual and inter-State complaints alleging violations of the ICCPR and to issue interpretative
General Comments of the ICCPR. OHCHR - HUM. RTS. COMM., http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/hrc/index.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
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The United Nations reiterated this point in General Comment No. 22
on ICCPR Article 18:
The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (which
includes the freedom to hold beliefs) in article 18.1 is far-reaching
and profound; it encompasses freedom of thought on all matters,
personal conviction and the commitment to religion or belief,
whether manifested individually or in community with others.
The Committee draws the attention of States parties to the fact
that the freedom of thought and the freedom of conscience are
protected equally with the freedom of religion and belief. The
fundamental character of these freedoms is also reflected in the
fact that this provision cannot be derogated from, even in time of
public emergency, as stated in article 4.2 of the Covenant.47
According to General Comment No. 22, the right to freedom of relig-
ion in ICCPR Article 18 “is not limited in its application to traditional reli-
gions,” and discrimination against a religion or belief “for any reason,
including the fact that they are newly established, or represent religious
minorities that may be the subject of hostility on the part of a predominant
religious community” is strictly prohibited.48
Indonesia is also a member state of ASEAN. Accordingly, it has
agreed to uphold the ASEAN Charter, the principles of which include:
h) adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the principles
of democracy and constitutional government;
i) respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protec-
tion of human rights, and the promotion of social justice;
j) upholding the United Nations Charter and international law,
including international humanitarian law, subscribed to by
ASEAN Member States.49
As such, pursuant to the Vienna Convention and the ASEAN Charter,
Indonesia is bound under international law to adhere to the United Nations
Charter.50
47. Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Human Rights Comm., General
Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion (Art. 18), ¶ 1,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (Sept. 27, 1993).
48. Id. ¶ 2. Amyebi Ligabo, Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression, has warned about
the dangers of sacrificing free expression for the sake of religious feelings. In his 2008 report to
the United National Human Rights Council, Mr. Ligabo states that “limitations are not intended to
suppress the expression of critical views, controversial opinions or politically incorrect state-
ments. . . . [T]hey are not designed to protect belief systems from external or internal criticism.”
See Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, ¶ 85, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/14 (Feb. 28,
2008) (by Amyebi Ligabo).
49. ASEAN Charter art. 2(h)–(j).
50. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that “[e]very treaty
in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” See
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Article 27
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Finally, the Preamble to the Indonesian Human Rights Act of 1999
incorporates the UDHR and the ICCPR into the corpus of Indonesian law:
“as a member of the United Nations, the nation of Indonesia has a moral
and legal responsibility to respect, execute, and uphold the Universal Decla-
ration on Human Rights promulgated by the United Nations, and several
other international instruments concerning human rights ratified by the Re-
public of Indonesia.”51 Article 7 of the Act stipulates that international
human rights regulations ratified by Indonesia are legally binding in
Indonesia.52
C. Indonesian Constitutional Framework
Indonesia’s Constitution, written in 1945, has two references to relig-
ion. The first reference is found in the preamble, which states that, “the
independence of Indonesia shall be formulated into a constitution of the
Republic of Indonesia which shall be built into a sovereign state based on a
belief in the One and Only God.”53 The second reference can be found in
Article 29 of the Constitution: “The State guarantees all persons the free-
dom of worship, each according to his/her own religion or belief.”54
There is some tension between these two references. The preamble
frames the basis of Indonesia’s statehood on Pancasila, introduced by
Sukarno in the 1940s.55 Pancasila makes monotheistic belief a central tenet
and, in doing so, calls into question the citizenship and rights of atheists and
polytheists.56 It is unclear whether Article 29 is to be read within the frame-
work of Pancasila or whether it offers broader religious freedom
protections.57
D. Religious Freedom Violations in Indonesia
Religious freedom in Indonesia is challenged by blasphemy and devi-
ancy laws, which require citizens to conform their religious expression to
the official interpretation of their religion. Moreover, citizens are required
to register their religion with the government, and religious land use is sub-
ject to community approval.58
further provides that adherence to domestic law is no justification for failure to perform the obli-
gations of a particular agreement. See id. art. 27.
51. Legislation Concerning Human Rights pmbl. (d) (Act No. 39/1999) (Indon.).
52. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 50, art. 7(2).
53. UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR REPUBLIK INDONESIA [CONSTITUTION] 1945 Preamble (Indon.).
54. Id. art. 29.
55. SALIM, SECULAR STATE, supra note 8, at 64.
56. Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Universal Periodic Review: Indonesia 1 (Oct. 2009)
(unpublished manuscript prepared for the United Nations Human Rights Council Universal Peri-
odic Review of Indonesia) (on file with the University of St. Thomas Law Journal).
57. Id. at 1–2.
58. Id. at 4–5.
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1. Blasphemy or Deviancy Laws
Law 1/PNPS/1965 on the Prevention of Mistreatment of Religion and/
or Blasphemy Act (“Blasphemy Act”)59 makes it unlawful “to, intention-
ally, in public, communicate, counsel, or solicit public support for an inter-
pretation of a religion or a form of religious activity that is similar to the
interpretations or activities of an Indonesian religion but deviates from the
tenets of that religion.”60 According to the Elucidation of the Blasphemy
Act (the “Elucidation”), one of the purposes of the Act is to “channel . . .
religiosity”61 toward six approved religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholi-
cism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism.62
The Blasphemy Act seeks to protect Indonesia’s six official religions
by punishing those who insult these religions or persuade others to convert
to unofficial religions.63 The Act also restricts intra-religious expression by
making it illegal to advocate “deviations from teachings of religion consid-
ered fundamental by scholars of the relevant religion.”64
The Blasphemy Act also has been used to impose criminal punish-
ments on people who belong to religions that derive from recognized reli-
gions. For example, in 2008, the Indonesian Minister of Religious Affairs,
the Attorney General, and the Minister of the Interior issued the Joint De-
cree on the Ahmadiyya (“Joint Decree”).65 The vast majority of Muslims do
not recognize the Ahmadiyya as Muslim because of their perceived devia-
tion from mainstream Islamic teachings.66 The Joint Decree orders mem-
bers of the Ahmadiyya sect, “as long as they consider themselves to hold to
Islam, to discontinue the promulgation of interpretations and activities that
are deviant from the principal teachings of Islam.”67 This presents religious
freedom problems. The sect is given the Hobson’s choice of following their
faith in its entirety and being sanctioned, or abandoning precepts of their
faith to avoid legal action.
The Blasphemy Act establishes civil and criminal penalties for viola-
tors. First and second offenses are punished by a civil penalty. On a first
offense, the offender “shall be instructed and be warned severely to cease
59. Prevention of Misuse of Religion and/or Blasphemy Act (Act No. 1/PNPS/1965)
(Indon.).
60. Id. art. 1.
61. Elucidation of Enactment of the President of the Republic of Indonesia (No. 1/PNPS of
1965 Concerning the Prevention of Religious Abuse and/or Defamation) § I(3).
62. Id. § II, art. 1.
63. See id. § I(4).
64. Id.
65. Joint Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Attorney General and the Minister
of the Interior of the Republic of Indonesia, KEP033/A/JA/6/2008 (June 9, 2008), available at
http://www.thepersecution.org/world/indonesia/docs/skb.html.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 2.
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his/her actions” by a minister of the federal government.68 For a second
offense, if the offender is an organization, the President of Indonesia may
dissolve it and declare it to be banned.69 Banned or dissolved organizations
have no legal personality and may not own property or legally practice their
beliefs in public.70
Another product of the Blasphemy Act is Article 156(a) of the Crimi-
nal Code, which makes blasphemy, or “deviant” interpretations, a crime
punishable by up to five years imprisonment. It outlaws deliberate, public
expressions of hostility, hatred, contempt, or disgrace against religion.71 Ar-
ticle 157 of the Code restricts media dissemination of any such “deviant”
ideas.72
These blasphemy laws have traditionally targeted Muslim sects con-
sidered to be heterodox by prominent Muslim leaders. One hundred fifty
individuals have been detained or arrested under Article 156(a) in the last
five years alone.73 In 2007, police detained one hundred twenty-five mem-
bers of the Muslim sect Al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah, a group whose leaders
claim to be prophets.74 The sect’s leader, despite denouncing his beliefs
publicly, was sentenced to four years in prison for “violating the criminal
code by committing blasphemous acts.”75
2. Ban on Proselytizing
The 1979 decree, Guidelines for the Propagation of Religion, banned
proselytizing for fear that it might disrupt inter-religious relations in the
more religiously diverse parts of Indonesia.76 The ban conflates proselytiz-
ing and blasphemy, negatively impacting religious groups for whom
proselytizing is a religious obligation.
Religious speeches and literature are permissible only when they are
delivered to members of the same religious group.77 Religious groups must
68. See Prevention of Misuse of Religion and/or Blasphemy Act, art. 2(1) (Act No. 1/PNPS/
1965) (Indon.).
69. See id. art. 2(2).
70. International Portrait: Indonesia (2007), THE PLURALISM PROJECT, available at http://65.
23.147.156/reports/view/32 (last visited Jan. 13, 2011).
71. U.S. Dep’t of State, Indonesia, ANN. REP. INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2008) [hereinafter
Indonesia Religious Freedom Report], available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108407.
htm (“Although the law applies to all officially recognized religions, the few cases in which it has
been enforced have almost always involved blasphemy and heresy against Islam.”).
72. U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANN. REP. 252–59 (2008).
73. See id. at 258.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Country Profile: Indonesia, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 203 (Paul A. Mar-
shall ed., 2008).
77. Indonesia Religious Freedom Report, supra note 71, at 6. Foreign missionaries and relig-
ious organizations must gain permission from the Ministry of Religious Affairs for a religious
worker visa. Some Christian organizations report varying difficulty getting a visa to the country.
Id. at 9.
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obtain a permit to host a public event; these permits are generally granted in
an unbiased manner unless the government fears the event may disrupt pub-
lic order by upsetting members of other faiths. It is unclear if the govern-
ment enforces these laws, and, if so, how they are enforced. Because of
decreased central authority, local authorities may vary in the enforcement of
this legislation depending on the religious makeup of the regional popula-
tion, the religious background of the local government, and the presence of
perceived “disruptive” religious groups.
3. Religious Registration
The Indonesian government officially recognizes six religious groups:
Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucian-
ism.78 Although conversions between official religions occur and are le-
gal,79 the freedom to change one’s religion is constrained by the ban on
proselytizing.80 Atheism is illegal by virtue of its violating the Pancasila
ideology’s monotheism precept. Unrecognized religions can register as a
social organization, though these groups may encounter discrimination
when registering, particularly when adherents try obtaining identification
cards, marriage licenses, and birth certificates for their children.81
4. Religious Land Use
There is particular abuse at the local level of laws regulating the con-
struction of religious buildings. These laws pose an obstacle to the free
religious expression of religious groups seeking to build or expand houses
of worship. Before construction can commence, the Housing Decree 1/2006
requires a religious group seeking to build a new building or expand a pre-
existing structure for religious purposes to obtain the approval of at least
ninety followers of that particular religious order and sixty community re-
sidents in the area where the structure is to be built, in addition to the final
approval of the Joint Forum for Religious Tolerance (FKUB).82 The FKUB
is a provincial panel comprised of religious leaders chosen proportionally
78. See Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, supra note 56, at 4.
79. Id.
80. Proselytizing is illegal as decreed in 1979 by the Ministries of Religion and Home Af-
fairs. Country Profile: Indonesia, supra note 76, at 203.
81. National identity cards (KTPs) among other civil documents identify the holder’s relig-
ion—one of the six nationally recognized ones. Members of minority religions are allowed to
leave this entry blank; however, in practice they often have to identify with one of the main
religions in order to receive one. Citizens without a KTP report problems finding work; therefore,
this results in civil discrimination against minority religions. Interfaith marriage presents another
obstacle as some government officials will not register or marry a man and woman who practice
two different religions. This poses problems as well when the couple wants to have children and
therefore need to obtain birth certificates. Some individuals convert in order to overcome this
impediment. International Portrait: Indonesia (2007), supra note 70, at 7–8.
82. Id. at 3.
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by the number of religious adherents in the province.83 The decree is, on its
face, problematic because it poses an unjust burden on religious groups. As
applied, the decree is even worse; it accedes power to local officials, who
can use the decree to abuse, discriminate against, and intimidate unpopular
or minority religions.84 According to representatives of minority religious
groups, the Housing Decree specifically targets house churches and small
Hindu temples. Some prominent Muslim leaders have contested that the
decree may violate Article 18 of the ICCPR.85
II. HISTORY OF SHARIA IMPLEMENTATION IN ACEH
A. Overview of the Aceh Province
Aceh differs from other regions of Indonesia because it has a distinct
political, religious, ethnic, and “arguably national”86 identity, “formed by
an indigenous pre-colonial state in the form of the Sultanate.”87 Other re-
gions of Indonesia developed their political identities with extensive influ-
ence from colonial powers and the nationalist movement.88
While Indonesian Muslims generally may not be conservative or even
particularly devout, Muslims in Aceh are on the whole very religious and
fiercely proud of their Islamic heritage. Aceh has a unique place in the
history of Islam’s growth, as it was in Aceh that Islam first arrived in
Southeast Asia.89 The earliest recording of Islam’s presence in Indonesia is
found in Marco Polo’s writings—he passed through the town of Perlak
(now within the boundaries of East Aceh) in 1292 and described it as a
Muslim town.90
83. Id. at 8.
84. Since the government promulgated the Revised Joint Ministerial Decree on the Construc-
tion of Houses of Worship in 2006, many minority religious groups have reported instances of
discrimination when trying to obtain approval of construction of houses of worship. For example,
in the regency of Langkat, North Sumatra, local authorities delayed Catholic officials from build-
ing a church, despite the fact that the group had met the requirements to do so. In West Java,
several churches report facing difficulty obtaining licenses to build. In Tangerang, West Java, The
Hindu Association reports ongoing obstacles to building a temple. In November of 2007, the local
government in Pura Penataran Agung Rinjani, Bayan, and West Lombok cancelled a permit to
construct a Hindu temple. These are among many instances of discrimination cited by minority
religions arising under The Housing Decree 1/2006. Id.
85. U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ANN. REP., supra note 72, at 256.
86. Kirsten E. Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organiza-
tion, 2 EAST-WEST CTR. POL’Y STUD. 1 (2004), available at www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/
stored/pdfs/PS002.pdf.
87. Rodd McGibbon, Local Leadership and the Aceh Conflict, in VERANDAH OF VIOLENCE
315, 318 (Anthony Reid ed., 2006).
88. Id.
89. Arskal Salim, ‘Shari’a from Below’ in Aceh (1930s–1960s): Islamic Identity and The
Right to Self-Determination with Comparative Reference to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF), 32 INDON. & MALAY WORLD 80, 83 (2004) [hereinafter Salim, Shari’a from Below].
90. Id.
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The first Muslim kingdom in Southeast Asia was also located in
Aceh.91 The earliest evidence of a Muslim dynasty in the region is the
gravestone of the first Muslim ruler of Samudra, Sultan Malik as-Salih,
dated 1297.92 Additional gravestones from the thirteenth century show that
Muslim rule continued through that period.93 The Moroccan traveler, Ibn
Battuta, passed through the area in 1345 and 1346 and confirmed the preva-
lence of Muslim rule.94
B. Political Structure in Aceh During the Sultanate
Prior to the Dutch conquest in 1873, the political structure of Aceh
consisted of six political subdivisions: kawom, gampong, mukim,
uleebalangship,95 sagi, and Sultanate.96 The smallest division was the
kawom, or clan, composed of “all the descendents of a common ancestor in
the male line . . . .”97 The gampong, the second-smallest political division,
bore much resemblance to a village and was comprised of geographically
close kawom.98 A group of gampongs formed mukims, or districts, and each
uleebalang, or territorial chief, was “lord over several . . . mukims.”99 Three
federations or provinces formed from the three sides, or sagi, of the “trian-
gular-shaped” Great Aceh.100 Three sagi plus the “actual territory of the
[s]ultan” formed the Sultanate.101
The sultan had de jure domain over the entire province, even though
his actual territory was restricted to the dalam, the royal enclosure contain-
ing the capital and royal palace.102 The sultan was vested with all “political,
judicial, and economic power,” and enforced Islamic laws, making him vi-
tal to the religious life of Aceh.103 In practice, however, the sultan “lack[ed]
de facto power over his Sultanate.”104 His territorial chiefs, the uleebalang,
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Teuku Iskandar, Aceh as a Muslim-Malay Cultural Centre (14th–19th Century), Address
before the First International Conference of Aceh and Indian Ocean Studies 2 (Feb. 24, 2007),
http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/docs/CAceh-project/full-papers/aceh_fp_teukuiskandar.pdf.
94. IBN BATTUA, TRAVELS IN ASIA AND AFRICA (H.A.R. Gibb trans., 1929).
95. While the other territorial words are of Acehnese origin, the term uleebalangship was
invented by the Dutch to describe the hierarchy and authority of uleebalang. A. Mukti Ali, An
Introduction to the Government of Acheh’s Sultanate, 6 AL DJAMI’AH, 1962, at 16.
96. Id. at 9.
97. Id.; see also A.G.C. Van Duyl, Dutch Success in Acheen and Its Lessons, IMPERIAL &
ASIATIC Q. REV. & ORIENTAL & COLONIAL REC., Jan.–Apr. 1895, at 437.
98. See 1 M. TH. HOUTSMA ET AL., E.J. BRILL’S FIRST ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 506
(1913–1936).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Ali, supra note 95, at 9.
102. Id. at 19.
103. Muslim Sultanate in South-East Asia, WORLD OF ISLAM PORTAL (Oct.26, 2005), http://
islam.worldofislam.info/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=390:muslim-sultanate-
in-south-east-asia&catid=106&Itemid=60.
104. Ali, supra note 95, at 27.
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often challenged him. The uleebalang, considered “the real rulers of the
country,”105 led the uleebalangships and appointed the paglima, or leaders,
of the kawom, gampong, and mukim.106 They also served as governors,
judges, military leaders, and entrepreneurs of Aceh.107 The diversity and
expanse of their roles in Acehnese society earned the uleebalang the title,
“lords of the country.”108
An Indonesian body, the Council of the State, consisting of uleebalang
and ulama was given the authority to dethrone a sultan, but this power was
rarely invoked.109 In fact, only two of the thirty-six sultans were forced
from the throne with the authority of the Council of State. The last sultan of
Indonesia was dethroned after the Dutch-Aceh war when the Dutch de-
clared the abolition of the Sultanate.110
The authority of local leaders dominated Acehnese society. Even
though sultans ruled all Acehnese citizens, including the uleebalang, the
Acehnese gave deference and respect to their local leaders. Each gampong
had three local authorities: keuchi, teungki, and ureuerg tuha, each of whom
was vested with different responsibilities.111 The keuchi controlled marriage
between members of different kawom, and movement among gampong.112
Even though the keuchi was given authority to make decisions on marriage
and relocation, he was expected to deliberate with his fellow leaders, the
other gampong authorities, on matters affecting the entire gampong. Should
the keuchi neglect this duty “in solving a common problem, he [would]
quickly lose his influence.”113 Because the people valued a close relation-
ship with their leaders, loss of influence could lead to his displacement by a
dissatisfied constituency.
Imams ruled the third social division, the mukim.114 Initially, the
imams served a wholly religious role, enforcing Sharia and ensuring pro-
scribed rites were not neglected.115 The imams cultivated “an Acehnese
identity based on pride in being an Islamic state that was the  ‘verandah of
Mecca’—the greatest outpost of Islamic scholarship in the Far East.”116 En-
forcement of Islamic law in Aceh was at times more severe than elsewhere
105. Id. at 18.
106. Id. at 9–10.
107. Id. at 15–16; ANTHONY REID, BLOOD OF THE PEOPLE 13 (1979).
108. Ali, supra note 95, at 15. The role of the uleebalang was also rooted deeply in ancient
origins and their authority was “confirmed, not created by the Sultans.” Id. at 16.
109. Id. at 12.
110. ANTHONY REID, THE ACEH CONFLICT: A LONG-TERM VIEW FOR LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS
10 (2008).
111. LEE KAM HING, THE SULTANATE OF ACEH: RELATIONS WITH THE BRITISH 8 (1995).
112. Id. at 12.
113. Id. at 13.
114. Id. at 14.
115. Id.
116. JOHN BRAITHWAITE ET AL., ANOMIE AND VIOLENCE: NON-TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
IN INDONESIAN PEACEBUILDING 345 (2010).
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in the Muslim world, including even Saudi Arabia.117 In pre-colonial Aceh,
penalties for those found guilty of alcohol consumption included “amputa-
tion of hands and pouring molten lead down the throats.”118 Although they
were elected and dismissed by uleebalangs, imams had more authority
within the gampong than the uleebalang did because they were more
closely connected to the people.119
The uleebalang governed the uleebalangships. The three most power-
ful and influential uleebalangs were elected to govern the sagi, which were
“a federation of uleebalangships.”120 While the panglima sagi, which the
uleebalang elected to govern the sagi, held much authority over the
Acehnese citizens, their authority was limited to general concerns, leaving
the uleebalangs who governed the uleebalangships to manage the details.121
Even the sultan himself struggled with the populist tendencies of the
Acehnese people. The “problem of succession to a Sultan depend[ed] on the
will of the uleebelang. They elected the new [s]ultan, and decided who
[would] reign over the country.”122 Should the sultan not be in good stead
with the uleebalang, he would be ousted from office. Such was the case for
Sultan Mahmud Syan (1760–81), who was overthrown three times by the
uleebalang, but managed to regain power each time.123
Aceh’s geography also made its governance difficult. With a long
coastline, political unity and administrative control were nearly impossi-
ble.124 The sultan resided in Banda Aceh, removed from the ports, which
the uleebalang controlled. Ships would moor in port and uleebalang would
transact directly with foreign traders. The distance between the sultan and
uleebalang made the inland sultan removed and helpless in “enforcing du-
ties and taxes on goods.”125 Chaos would also break loose off the coast of
Aceh. Piracy was on the rise, many blaming the uleebalang for pillaging the
trade ships.126
1. The Ulama and the Sultanate
The ulama, or religious scholars, took on a prominent role in the royal
establishment, serving as religious advisors to the sultans and sultanahs.127
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. HING, supra note 111, at 15.
120. Id. at 17.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 19.
123. Lee Kam Hing, Aceh at the Time of 1824 Treaty, in VERANDAH OF VIOLENCE, supra note
87, at 72, 80.
124. Id. at 82.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 78.
127. M. HASBI AMIRUDDIN, THE RESPONSE OF THE ULAMA DAYAH TO THE MODERNIZATION
OF ISLAMIC LAW IN ACEH 9–10 (2005). The Acehnese Sultanate was governed by queens from the
period 1641–1699. Id. at 10.
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The ulama were also seen as the people’s representatives in the royal court.
As appointed judges, the uleebalang mediated between the sultan and the
people and needed the ulama to administer justice in order for the adminis-
tration to be effective and credible.128 The people needed the ulama to not
only represent them but also to provide moral guidance.129
The ulama were teachers in the dayah, or religious schools, which
were the only educational institutions available during the Sultanate.130 As
Aceh’s moral guardians, when they perceived religious observance as
weakening, the ulama led social and religious reforms to revive religious
devotion.131 And as the primary arbiters of knowledge, the ulama were able
to exercise broad influence over the ruling elite, at times having greater
control than the rulers.132
A historical partition divided the Sultan and ulama from the
uleebalang. During periods of harmony, all three parties would relate well
with a mutual respect for the division of the religious authority. Driven by
their religious loyalty, the ulama educated the Muslim faithful in how to
live orthodox Muslim lives and worked to establish society based on Is-
lamic precepts by implementing Sharia in Aceh.133 This was in direct con-
trast to the uleebalang, who wanted only to retain control of their territories
and did not have broader religious aims or authority.134 The ulama were
loyal to the sultan, so long as they believed the sultan faithfully adhered to
the precepts of Islam. In 1773, for example, the ulama endorsed the formal
dethronement of Sultan Jauhar al-Alam under the pretext of jihad because
of his failure to abide by Islamic precepts.135
C. British Colonization
The Dutch and British established trade routes between India and
China through their East India Companies as they colonized the South Pa-
cific. Aceh was a strategic post along this trade route, and the British saw
Aceh as important to regain a strong presence in the Malay Archipelago and
to check Dutch expansion.136 In hopes of establishing a stronghold in
Southeast Asia, the British initiated contact with the Sultan of Aceh, Jauhar,
who agreed to allow Britain to build a trading factory in the province.137
128. See id. at 11.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 14. As the education system advanced, the ulama broadened their curricula to
compete with the Dutch, instituting the madrasa. See REID, supra note 107, at 22.
131. AMIRUDDEN, supra note 127, at 14.
132. For example, the fourth Sultanah of Aceh, Keumalatsyah, was deposed by a fatwa stating
that a female cannot be the ruler. Id.
133. Id. at 318.
134. Id.
135. HING, supra note 111, at 12, 194, 206.
136. Hing, supra note 123, at 88.
137. Id.
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However, as Britain focused on Aceh, the Dutch were staking their claim in
other parts of Sumatra. Seeing potential for conflict, the British and Dutch
entered into the London Treaty of 1824 where Britain ceded its territorial
holds in Aceh to the Dutch and the Dutch transferred their territories in
India to Britain.138
D. Dutch Invasion and the Dutch-Aceh War
The Dutch sent delegates to Aceh in August of 1873 to compel the
Acehnese to recognize Dutch sovereignty over Aceh by declaring the Sul-
tanate abolished. When the Acehnese opposed this assertion of sovereignty,
the Dutch declared war. In 1903, the Dutch partially conquered Aceh by
suppressing and dispersing majority populations while strengthening minor-
ities. Realizing the heavy influence the ulama had over the Acehnese, the
Dutch placed the province under “political and religious quarantine,”139
thereby preventing the region from receiving outside influence that may
“exploit the ulamas’ dissatisfactions” with Dutch control.140 In addition, the
Dutch, with the help of the uleebalang, compelled Acehnese youth to enroll
in semi-modernized secular schools instead of religious schools.141 The sec-
ular education of these youth eventually led to a rift between orthodox and
reformist Muslims, which the Dutch capitalized on by accentuating the divi-
sion and further weakening the influence of the orthodox ulama.142
After the Dutch conquest, the relationship between the uleebalangs
and the Acehnese deteriorated, in large part due to the greed of the
uleebalang. Concurrent with their suppression of ulama, the Dutch be-
friended uleebalang and granted them administrative authority, which the
uleebalang used to “define the rules of the game and control trade.”143 The
uleebalang embezzled religious tithes (zakat) and levied corve´e for their
own private purposes.144 They also maintained virtual monopolies over and
held nearly all the profit resulting from coffee, rubber, pepper, rice, and
betelnut production.145 The increase in uleebalang power, their corruption,
and the resulting distrust of them by the people “widened the gulf between
uleebalang and their subjects,” making the uleebalang reliant on the Dutch,
138. Anthony Reid, The Pre-Modern Sultanate’s View of Its Place in the World, in VERANDAH
OF VIOLENCE, supra note 87, at 52, 52.
139. NAZARUDDIN SJAMSUDDIN, THE REPUBLICAN REVOLT: A STUDY OF THE ACEHNESE RE-
BELLION 16 (1985).
140. Id. at 17.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 18. The reformists were primarily the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the
PUSA.
143. John Braithwaite, Aceh, Indonesia 2 (Peacebuilding Compared Project, Working Paper
No. 5, 2010), available at http://cigj.anu.edu.au/cigj/link_documents/Publications/Acehwebsite
vers.pdf.
144. REID, supra note 107, at 14.
145. Id.
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rather than popular support, to meet their ends.146 The Dutch still kept the
uleebalang under their control. When it appeared the uleebalang were
groveling for too much, the Dutch would float the idea of restoring the
Sultanate, something the uleebalang vehemently opposed.147
As the connection between the uleebalang and the people weakened,
the ulama’s relationship with the people became increasingly strong. Some
of the uleebalang responded to the Dutch invasion by resisting it, while
others defected to the Dutch side. Many vacillated between the two fac-
tions.148 The ulama, on the other hand, emerged as the primary leaders
against the Dutch invaders. They declared the struggle “jihad.” By charac-
terizing the war as a holy war and making it incumbent on all Muslims to
engage in battle against the Dutch, the ulama injected the struggle not just
with immense manpower but also tremendous passion and religious fer-
vor.149 Common phrases and concepts associated with jihad were employed
in the ulama’s sermons about the war; the Dutch aggressor was a kafir al-
harb (unbeliever at war), and anyone who died in battle against this kafir
was a martyr, promised eternal rewards.150 For those who waged battle and
survived, war spoils were for the taking. In invigorating the Muslim spirit to
wage war, the ulama’s scope of influence became increasingly prominent,
such that the Dutch army offered monetary rewards for the capture of some
of the more influential scholars.151 Later attempts at Sharia implementation
would be seen as a continuation of this religious mission; it was “seen as a
continuation, but in different form, of their jihad during the Aceh war
against colonial rule ‘to encourage people to look beyond their local com-
munities to the wider world of Islam.’”152
In 1941, Japan invaded Penang, Malaysia, across the Strait of Me-
laka.153 Said Abu Bakar, a leader of All Aceh Ulama Association (Per-
satuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh (PUSA)), approached the Japanese offering
them “active support” in ousting the Dutch “with no particular quid pro
quo.”154 Bakar explained that as part of the ulama, he and the Acehnese
were not only “extremely hostile to the Dutch government, but also to the
uleebelang because they . . . oppressed the people even more than the
Dutch.”155 It is important to note that the ulama’s fight against the
uleebalang was not motivated by the desire to wrest control away from the
146. Id. at 15.
147. Id. at 20.
148. AMIRUDDEN, supra note 127, at 16.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 17.
151. Id.
152. Salim, Shari’a from Below, supra note 89, at 84.
153. ANTHONY REID, IMPERIAL ALCHEMY: NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL IDENTITY IN SOUTH-
EAST ASIA 125 (2010) [hereinafter IMPERIAL ALCHEMY].
154. Id.
155. Id.
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uleebalang; instead, it was resistance against the uleebalang’s corruption
and their pandering to the Dutch.156
The people’s distrust of the uleebalang provided fertile ground for the
re-emergence of the ulama, which started in the 1920s and culminated in
1939, with the founding of PUSA.157 Days before Japan arrived in Aceh,
the ulama-led PUSA revolted against the Dutch, forcing them to leave in
March of 1942.158 Because of the ulama’s persistent struggle against them,
the Dutch had never managed to fully subjugate the Acehnese.159 After the
Dutch withdrawal, the Acehnese acceded to Japanese control without de-
manding independence.160 Bakar and the PUSA demanded freedom only
from “forced labour and tax, and punishment of the uleebelang . . . whom
he and the PUSA . . . most opposed.”161
Under Japanese control, the uleebalang lost their privileged status.
They never earned Japanese sympathy because they “failed to compete with
PUSA [the ulama] leaders in mobilizing the work-force” to serve as
romusha, or forced laborers.162 Like the Dutch before them, the Japanese
did not give the ulama the freedom they sought. To weaken their influence,
the Japanese arrested key members of the PUSA, including Daud Beureueh,
who would be instrumental later in fighting for Acehnese autonomy from
the Indonesian state.163 The Japanese were forced to leave Aceh when Indo-
nesia gained independence in 1945.164
Throughout the many rebellions, revolts, and uprisings in Aceh, the
real conflict was between the ulama and the uleebalang. Colonial powers,
like the Dutch and Japanese, would strengthen their control by exploiting
the differences between the local ulama and uleebalang.
E. The Ulama, Dutch Colonization, and the Fall of the Sultanate
The height of ulama loyalty to the sultan was during the Dutch-Aceh
war, where the ulama, who opposed the Dutch, gave full support to the
sultan. The ulama saw the Dutch and their Western ideals as a threat to
Muslim culture. The ulama resisted Dutch expansion and declared the
struggle a “perang sabil or holy war against the foreign infidels.”165 In
1939, the young alim Daud Beureueh founded PUSA to unite reformist and
156. Alfian, The Ulama in Acehnese Society, in READINGS ON ISLAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 82
(Ahmad Ibrahim et al. eds., 1985).
157. Id. at 83.
158. IMPERIAL ALCHEMY, supra note 153, at 125–26.
159. LUKMAN THAIB, THE ROOTS OF THE ACEHNESE STRUGGLE 15 (1999).
160. IMPERIAL ALCHEMY, supra note 153, at 126.
161. Id.
162. THAIB, supra note 159, at 21.
163. SJAMSUDDIN, supra note 139, at 21.
164. Id. at 23.
165. McGibbon, supra note 87, at 318.
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orthodox ulama and advance Islamic culture in Aceh.166 In the early stages
of colonization, the ulama mobilized Islamic students and youth to elimi-
nate the uleebalang.167 Leading uleebalang either fled the region or were
killed by activist ulama, resulting in a shift in power from the uleebalang to
ulama when Indonesia gained independence from the Dutch in the
1940s.168
The ulama’s commitment to fighting the Dutch and preserving Aceh’s
Islamic character gave the war “a primarily religious character.”169 The Sul-
tanate collapsed in 1903 with the surrender of Aceh’s last sultan, Sultan
Muhammad Daud Syah (1874–1903). Even with the fall of the Sultanate,
the tenacity of the ulama and their constant pushback to Dutch control pre-
vented the Dutch from gaining complete control of the region.170 This
would later augment Acehnese claims of semi-autonomy.
Even after the Dutch were ousted from Aceh and the uleebalang were
dispersed, the ulama still faced conflict with the nationalists who believed
the ulama were advocates of a “fanatical brand of Islam in Aceh,” reflected
most prominently in their desire to implement Sharia in the region.171 Na-
tionalists, lead by Sukarno, believed imposing Sharia on its citizens would
fracture the burgeoning nation.172
F. The Ulama After the Dutch Occupation
The strife between the Indonesian nationalists and Acehnese autono-
mists came to a head in 1953. The central government incorporated Aceh
into the North Sumatra province as nationalist leaders consolidated the na-
tion into only ten provinces.173 The Acehnese, infuriated by this perceived
assault on their autonomy, revolted. Daud Beureueh of the PUSA joined the
broader Darul Islam rebellion and led the Acehnese autonomists in revolt
against Indonesian nationalists.174 The PUSA and Darul Islam Movement
were motivated to transform Indonesia into an Islamic state, with the imple-
mentation of Sharia, unlike the separatist forces of the Free Aceh Move-
ment, who would not be satisfied until Aceh earned independence from
Indonesia.175 After six years of fighting, leaders in Jakarta quelled the up-
rising by giving Aceh autonomy to “manage local affairs in the areas of
166. SJAMSUDDIN, supra note 139, at 5.
167. McGibbon, supra note 87, at 319.
168. Id.
169. SJAMSUDDIN, supra note 139, at 16.
170. Id.
171. McGibbon, supra note 87, at 319.
172. See supra notes 18–27 and accompanying text.
173. MICHELLE ANN MILLER, REBELLION AND REFORM IN INDONESIAN: JAKARTA’S SECURITY
AND AUTONOMY POLICIES IN ACEH 42 (2009).
174. Id. at 42–43; McGibbon, supra note 87, at 319; Schulze, supra note 86, at 1.
175. MILLER, supra note 173, at 42–43.
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religion, customary law and education,”176 under the 1959 resolution to the
Darul Islam Movement.177 Although Aceh had formal recognition of its
semi-autonomy, the nationalist republic did not honor the agreement. Indo-
nesia feared that ceding control to Aceh’s religious ulama would “under-
mine the secular underpinnings of the state.”178 This failure to honor the
promise of Acehnese autonomy heightened the tension between the ulama
and the secular nationalists.179
The 1960s saw the rise of the Indonesian Community Party (PKI),
whom the ulama opposed.180 Because the PKI led to “anticommunist po-
grom and bloodletting across Indonesia,” including “an attempted coup that
involved the killing of top military commanders,” the ulama collaborated
with the military to mobilize youth and religious activists to resist the
PKI.181 The youth included religious followers of Islam as well as techno-
crats—students and intellectuals from state universities.
Importantly, the ulama capitalized on their relationship with the mili-
tary to pressure the central Indonesian government to formally recognize
Aceh’s semi-autonomous status. Only then could Aceh implement Sharia in
lieu of adat (custom), or other conflicting Indonesian laws.182 The spirited
ulama effort was, however, to no avail. Although Indonesia issued a provin-
cial regulation permitting the implementation of Sharia, the regulation
failed to earn approval from the central government.183
Suharto ascended to the presidency in 1966 at the height of anti-com-
munist vigor.184 He sought a unified nation, which prevented him from ap-
pealing to the ulama or the uleebalang. The ulama resisted national
unification to preserve their distinct Acehnese identity while the uleebalang
lost their social authority after the Dutch rulers were forced to leave in the
1940s.185 Suharto formed alliances with intellectuals and students of the
state universities—the technocrats—who, along with the ulama, had allied
with the military against the PKI.186 The two parties were driven to resist
the PKI for different reasons: the technocrats were concerned with breaking
Aceh’s political and economic isolation in contrast to the ulama’s interest in
protecting Aceh’s Islamic identity.187
176. McGibbon, supra note 87, at 319.
177. Id. at 332.
178. Id. at 319.
179. See id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 319–20.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 321–22.
185. Cf. id. at 322–23.
186. Id. at 320.
187. Id. at 323.
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Suharto began a campaign to neutralize the ulama’s influence by
“curb[ing] political participation and . . . put[ting] an end to the kind of
ideological mobilization that Sukarno had encouraged.”188 The neutraliza-
tion of the ulama was a decades-long affair that eventually undermined the
ulama’s influence and disintegrated their unity. Suharto promoted Pan-
casila (the ideology of monotheism that serves as the foundation of the
Indonesian state) in lieu of “religion and ethnic politics.”189 The military of
the New Order suppressed political speech, leading to a decline in Islamic
discourse.190 In the 1970s, the Suharto government eliminated the multiple-
party system. Indonesia once included a variety of “nationalist, Islamic, and
communist constituencies,” but now only permits two parties in opposition
to the government party, Golka.191 Before the party consolidation, multiple
parties represented different Islamic ideals. “The forced amalgamation of
Islamic parties into the United Development Party (PPP) weakened the
main political channels through which Islamic aspirations could be ex-
pressed.”192 Suharto also established a complicated system of “patronage
and sanctions” that benefited the New Order supporters to the detriment of
the ulama.193
As conciliation for ostracizing the once-powerful ulama, Suharto es-
tablished the Islamic Scholars Council (MUI). The scholars that cooperated
with the Suharto regime were appointed to this religious bureaucracy,
where they could influence the New Order with Islamic ideals.194 The most
radical and orthodox scholars, however, would not earn an appointment on
the MUI because they were principally opposed to Suharto’s secular regime
and had not earned Suharto’s favor. The elevation of moderate ulama over
the orthodox created a rift among the ulama. While many ulama saw an
appointment to the MUI as the highest of duties and the most important
institution for Muslims, rural ulama disagreed, believing dayah (boarding
schools) to be the most important institutions.195
In 1982, the once-fledgling national Islamic party, the United Develop-
ment Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)) won a general
Acehnese provincial election, ousting the incumbent governor.196 The PPP
gained popularity by campaigning on its “special status theme and using
Islamic symbols.”197 This loss signified the technocrats were losing popular
188. Id. at 322.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 323.
194. Id.
195. Id. (within the dayah, the rural ulama could feed the minds of young Muslims educating
them in the faith and teaching them to live courageously).
196. Id. at 324.
197. Id. (internal punctuation omitted).
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support and Aceh was establishing its independent identity.198 Even though
the ulama had lost much formal authority, they still had a strong relation-
ship with the Acehnese people.199 The technocrats, in contrast, retained
their control by relying on their “technical expertise and their links to the
central government,” instead of popular support.200 Although the techno-
crats regained political office in Aceh, the ulama continued to challenge the
legitimacy of the technocrats.201 Because of their dependence on the New
Order government for legitimacy, the technocrats relied on tactics of politi-
cal coercion to sustain their power. Acehnese citizens eventually became
jaded by the technocrats’ claim to power.202
The New Order regime collapsed in 1998, resulting in the fall of the
technocratic power. The technocrats relied on the support of the central
government for their success. Such support sheltered the technocrats from
popular demands.203 By the time the New Order fell, the ulama had lost
their social cohesiveness and their social base had been transformed.204 The
ulama who held political positions had the financial means to send their
children to public university where they were influenced by technocrats.
Instead of educating their children in the traditional dayahs and madrasas,
the public education lead to an erosion of the “social basis upon which the
ulama constituted a coherent political force in Aceh and . . . blur[red] [the]
traditional ideological and political divisions.”205
The radical Islamic group, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), capital-
ized on the lack of political order by assembling student Islamic groups
across the political spectrum to demand Islamic reform in Aceh.206 Facing a
collapsing government and fearful of GAM’s ability to mobilize his citi-
zens, the Acehnese governor acceded to some of GAM’s demands.207 The
concession gave the impression that the Indonesian government, through its
extension in Aceh, recognized “GAM as having some legitimacy as [sic]
least as a dialogue partner.”208
President Habibie, Suharto’s successor and Indonesia’s third president,
drafted a law granting semi-autonomous status to Aceh.209 Habibie was mo-
tivated by the prospect of unifying Indonesia; he saw the GAM separatist
movement as a serious threat to national unity and believed that giving the
198. Id.
199. See id. at 325.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 327.
202. See id. at 330.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 328.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 330–31.
207. Id. at 331.
208. Id. at 332.
209. Id.
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ulama authority to implement Sharia in Aceh would diminish GAM’s
strength and eliminate its motivations for secession.210 He also believed that
permitting Aceh to implement Sharia would restore the faith of the
Acehnese in the central government.211 As such, Habibie conceded to the
PPP politicians who sought to revive the 1959 resolution of Acehnese au-
tonomy granted to the Darul Islam Movement.212
The Habibie resolution, Indonesian law 44/1999, recognized Aceh’s
autonomy in religion, education, and local customary law.213 It also granted
the provincial legislature authority to create a council of ulama with the
same status and authority as the provincial legislature.214 Aceh’s legislature
implemented the 1999 law by creating the Consultative Council of Ulama
(Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama (MPU)), an independent advisory coun-
cil of ulama charged with reviewing new provincial policies.215 The MPU
became a forum of active policy-making power for ulama,216 and although
it was an outgrowth of the MUI, the MPU, unlike the MUI, had indepen-
dent legal authority to influence the legislative process.217 Sharia did not,
however, resolve the Acehnese conflict. Although the MPU strengthened
ulama in the public square, the ulama remained fragmented,218 no longer
held the undisputed leadership position they possessed in the 1950s, and
lacked the political support to enforce Sharia.219
G. Modern Attempts at Sharia Implementation in Aceh
Sharia, literally meaning “way to a watering place,” is the way of life
for Muslims.220 It regulates a Muslim’s relationship with God and man by
providing social, moral, religious, and legal guidance.221 Unlike Western
law—springing from thoughts of men—Sharia is believed to have a Divine
foundation.222 In addition to the Quran, three other sources comprise
Sharia: the sunnah, or tradition, of the Prophet Muhammad as well as ijma,
the consensus of the ulama, and qiyas, or analogical deductions.223
210. MILLER, supra note 173, at 91–92; see also McGibbon, supra note 87, at 332–33.
211. ELIZABETH F. DREXLER, ACEH, INDONESIA: SECURING THE INSECURE STATE 163–64
(2008).
212. McGibbon, supra note 87, at 332.
213. Id.
214. MILLER, supra note 173, at 52.
215. Id. at 91.
216. McGibbon, supra note 87, at 333.
217. See id.; see also MILLER, supra note 173, at 91; SALIM, SECULAR STATE, supra note 8, at
155.
218. MILLER, supra note 173, at 91.
219. Id. at 92.
220. ABDUR RAHMAN I. DOI, SHARI’AH: THE ISLAMIC LAW 2 (1984).
221. Id. at 7.
222. Id. at 6.
223. Id. at 7.
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Sharia contains broad standards for how to live life. Its implementation
depends on fiqh.224 Islamic jurisprudence, fiqh, is a method for understand-
ing the text of the Quran as well as interpreting law. Sharia is considered
“immutable and transcendent” because of its breadth and divine nature,
while specific legal rulings are “mutable and temporal” because they are
issued by humans.225 The first two sources of law (the Quran and sunnah)
are no longer changing and evolving because Divine revelation has ceased
and the Prophet has passed away—what is developing are the interpreta-
tions of these original sources of law. As such, fiqh today is arguably
“treated as the primary source of law.”226 Ulama are vested with much au-
thority in advancing the practice of Islam because adding to the Sharia ca-
non requires consensus of ulama, in the form of ijma.
Sharia can be bifurcated into legal rules and the moral and religious
code.227 The legal rules govern trade, commerce, crime, and government
administration.228 The moral and religious code requires Muslims to follow
the five pillars of Islam: 1) shahada, professing “There is no God but God
and Muhammad is God’s Messenger;” 2) salat, praying five times a day; 3)
zakat, offering a tithe based on accumulated wealth; 4) sawm, fasting during
Ramadan; and 5) hajj, making pilgrimage to Mecca at least once during
one’s lifetime.229
A widely distributed booklet in modern Aceh, A Brief Introduction to
Islamic Sharia Law in Aceh,230 refers to the history of Sharia in the region
as a motivation for modern attempts at Sharia implementation. The earliest
clear records indicate that Sharia was implemented in Aceh around the late
sixteenth or early seventeenth century, with an Islamic court applying
Sharia punishments for theft, drunkenness, and offenses against members of
the Acehnese royalty.231
A Brief Introduction refers to both “written records” and the “current
collective memory of the people of Aceh”232 and states that this memory
reflects that the “people of Aceh had been relatively perfect in implement-
ing Sharia in their daily life, in the community life and in the nation’s life
during the period of the Sultanate, that is, before it was disturbed and inter-
224. Id. at 12.
225. Id.
226. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, The Shari’ah: A Methodology or a Body of Substantive Rules?, in
ISLAMIC LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 177, 185 (Nicholas Heer ed., 1990).
227. Kathleen M. Moore, Islamic Law, in LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: A POLITICAL,
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 752, 754 (Herbert M. Kritzer ed., 2002); SALIM, SECULAR
STATE, supra note 8, at 12.
228. SALIM, SECULAR STATE, supra note 8, at 11.
229. Moore, supra note 227, at 753.
230. AL YASA ABUBAKAR, A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC SHARIA LAW IN ACEH, (Yas-
min Purba trans., date unknown) (translation on file with author) [hereinafter A BRIEF
INTRODUCTION].
231. SALIM, SECULAR STATE, supra note 8, at 83.
232. Id.
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fered with by the Dutch colonists.”233 What A Brief Introduction fails to
acknowledge, however, are the drastically different social and political cir-
cumstances of the original Sharia implementation as compared to the mod-
ern socio-political environment in Aceh. As will be discussed later, this
distinction is key to any human rights analysis of modern day Sharia
regulations.
III. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IMPLICATIONS OF SHARIA
IMPLEMENTATION IN ACEH
A. Overview of Modern Sharia Qanun
Before Aceh began codifying Sharia, the MUI Aceh Council issued
fatwa, or nonbinding decrees, to regulate social behavior. In 1980, the MUI
issued a fatwa forbidding intermarriage between Muslims and non-Muslims
and a year later another fatwa forbade Muslims from participating in any
Christian ceremony.234 These fatwa were issued to put a damper on relig-
ious intermixing, including intermarriage, even though religious pluralism
can be traced back to the Prophet Muhammad when Jews and other relig-
ious sects lived among Muslims.235
In 1990, the MUI Aceh Council issued a fatwa ordering women to
wear jilbab, which is the term used in Aceh to refer to the headscarf.236
Women in the region, regardless of their religion, were ordered to “cover all
of their body except for face, hands, and feet, and that when engaged in
worship, women had to cover all but the face.”237 The objective was to
prevent young men from committing sex crimes and acts of violence, often
propagated by sexual immorality.238 Even though the fatwa was non-bind-
ing, GAM conducted jilbab raids on Acehnese women, often cutting their
hair when it was uncovered.239 No government regulation ever revoked the
fatwa, even though effort has been made to make wearing jilbab an individ-
ual choice.240 The fear and uncertainty generated by these fatwa has only
been amplified with the recent codification of Sharia.
233. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION, supra note 230. The written records referred to are Mir’at al-
Tullab, by Sheikh Abdurrauf Syiah Kuala and Safinatul Hukkam fi Takhlishil Khashsham by
Sheikh Jalaluddin Turasani. Each of these books was commissioned by the Sultanate to serve as
guidelines for the Sharia court in resolving cases. According to A Brief Introduction, these judicial
manuals spell out legal procedures in considerable detail. Id.
234. JOHN R. BOWEN, ISLAM, LAW, AND EQUALITY IN INDONESIA 235 (2003).
235. Id. at 240. The effect of prohibiting interreligious marriages, however, led to some people
leaving Islam; an unwanted consequence of issuing fatwa aimed at making the country more
“Muslim” was, ironically, causing some people to leave the religion. Id. at 245.
236. Id. at 231.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 232.
240. Id.
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The Provincial Legislature of Aceh elected to formally enact Sharia,
even though the vast majority of Acehnese followed the Sharia before it
was codified.241 Preserving the social and political identity of Aceh, pro-
moting civil order, and increasing public morality in the face of globaliza-
tion and tourism motivated the legislature in enacting these regulations. The
Acehnese legislature also sought to preserve traditional Muslim values and
Aceh’s special identity, distinguishing itself from Dutch influences. For-
mally implementing Sharia was also intended to encourage the Acehnese to
continue abiding by Sharia in their private lives, which is the basis of a
strong moral society. Finally, the Acehnese legislature believed codifying
Sharia would preserve civil order by providing a religious basis for the law;
the citizens of Aceh now had incentive to honor what would otherwise be
secular law. For instance, according to one Sharia scholar in Aceh, the
Acehnese would not wear helmets when riding their mopeds until they were
given a religious justification for the law.242 As for the religious adherents
themselves, they were torn between wanting and disavowing state-sup-
ported religion. They sought it because it provided a forceful hammer to
suppress heterodox religious leaders, but it also led to unwanted state inter-
ference in ritual and worship.243
Immediately after the national legislature passed Law 44/1999 grant-
ing autonomy to the Acehnese legislature to enact Sharia, the provincial
Acehnese legislature passed Regional Regulation No. 451.1/21249, requir-
ing all female government employees to wear Islamic garb, that is, a head-
scarf and, in place of pants, a skirt.244 Religious garb, like all other religious
duties or practices, is dependent on a given believer’s level of devotion and
particular interpretation of his or her religion. By requiring female govern-
ment employees to wear Islamic dress, the government imposed its own
interpretation on women, usurping their freedom and abrogating the indi-
vidual Muslim’s “permanent and inescapable responsibility” to know and
uphold Sharia.245 This is also in contravention of Indonesia’s and Aceh’s
accession to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which re-
quires that all citizens have the freedom of thought, conscience, and relig-
ion.246 Although National Law 44/1999 grants Aceh semi-autonomy on
matters of religion, education, and local customary law, Aceh is still bound
to the national government on matters of international relations, specifically
241. Interview with Muslim Ibrahim in Aceh, Indonesia (Apr. 2010).
242. Muslim Ibrahim claims he has statistical data to prove this, although it has not been
provided to the author. Id.
243. BOWEN, supra note 234, at 240.
244. MILLER, supra note 173, at 54.
245. ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE FU-
TURE OF SHARI’A 14 (2008).
246. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 38; see also Council on Foundations,
supra note 41.
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international treaties and covenants such as the UDHR and ICCPR. Because
Aceh is bound by the national government on matters of international rela-
tions, by usurping Muslims’ religious freedom, the Acehnese legislature has
violated specific international treaties.
Even before the local regulations were in place, a public campaign to
socially enforce Sharia erupted.247 Women, even those privately employed,
were pressured by vigilante mobs to wear jilbab.248 In 2001, the national
legislature passed a second law, 18/2001, granting Aceh greater autonomy
to manage its economy, direct local elections, and establish Sharia
courts.249 That same year, under the authority of the two national statutes
(44/1999 and 18/2001), Aceh established the MPU council of ulama, which
held the same authority as the Provincial Legislature of Aceh, and a govern-
ment Sharia agency (Dinas Syriat Islam).250 Unlike the MUI, the MPU had
the authority to enact enforceable Sharia laws, power it ultimately utilized.
These two groups were in large part responsible for drafting the qanun,
which codified Sharia for the region.
In 2002, the provincial legislature enacted a regulation, or qanun, for
Islamic dress code and created the position of “lashing executioner,” who
would publicly cane those who commit religious offenses.251 This same
qanun, the Qanun Aqidah, stipulated that Sunni Islam is the only lawful
interpretation of the faith, and requires all Muslims in Aceh to “faithfully
embrace this creed.”252 Acehnese are thereby prevented “from subscribing
to non-Sunni Muslim creeds, such as Shi’i [and] Liberal Islam.”253 Here,
the government is regulating a personal choice: man’s relationship with
God.254 By regulating belief as such, this qanun also conflicts with the In-
donesian Constitution, which permits every citizen the freedom “to embrace
and to practice the religion of his/her choice.”255 There are additional
problems with this qanun because it fails to stipulate how a prosecutor
247. EDWARD ASPINALL, ISLAM AND NATION: SEPARATIST REBELLION IN ACEH, INDONESIA
210 (2009).
248. Id.
249. Michelle Ann Miller, The Role of Islamic Law (Sharia) In Post-Tsunami Reconstruction,
in POST-DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION: LESSONS FROM ACEH (Mathew Clarke et al. eds., forthcom-
ing 2010) [hereinafter Miller, Islamic Law].
250. Id.
251. QANUN 11/2002 (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Provincial Bylaws) (unpublished transla-
tion on file with author).
252. Id.; Arskal Salim, The Sharia Bylaws and Human Rights in Indonesia 15 (July 25, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of St. Thomas Law Journal) (an earlier draft
of this paper was presented at the International Conference of the Law and Society in the 21st
Century, at Humboldt University in Berlin, Germany, July 25–28, 2007) [hereinafter Salim,
Sharia Bylaws].
253. Salim, Sharia Bylaws, supra note 252, at 15.
254. Id.
255. UNDANG-UNDAND DASAR REPUBLIK INDONESIA [Constitution] 1945 Art. 29 (Indon.).
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would prove a violation, what constitutes apostasy, and what the associated
criminal sanctions are.256
In 2004, the Provincial Legislature of Aceh enacted Qanun Zakat, di-
recting for public management of zakat, or religious tithes.257 By codifying
the Qanun Zakat, the Provincial Legislature, once again, removes from the
believers the right to “freely choose a way to perform their religious obliga-
tions.”258 That same year Aceh established the Sharia police (wilayatul his-
bah), and the province experienced a subsequent rise in vigilante
activism.259 Sweeps of public places including beaches, hotels, and cafes
were led by the wilayatul hisbah in search of jilbab violations.260
In 2006, the Provincial Legislature enacted the Law on Governing
Aceh,261 requiring all Muslims in Aceh to follow Sharia and all non-Mus-
lims to respect it.262 This law leaves undefined the meaning of “respect,”
bearing the risk that non-Muslims may be held to the same standards as
Muslims, particularly by a vigilante prosecutor.
B. Sharia Qanun Evaluated in Detail
In 2003, the Provincial Legislature of Aceh passed Sharia qanun gov-
erning alcoholic drinks,263 gambling,264 and illicit relations between men
and women (khalwat).265 Claiming “special autonomy” from the central
government of Indonesia, the Provincial Legislature based these laws on
Sharia “to enforce public order, security, peace, fair[ness] and prosper[ity]
to obtain the blessing from God.”266 With a broad scope and near-universal
applicability, the qanun attempt to preempt other regulations that may con-
flict with them.267 The Sharia-based qanun apply to all people living or
working in the jurisdiction, regardless of the citizen’s religious belief, that
256. Salim, Sharia Bylaws, supra note 252, at 15.
257. QANUN 7/2004 (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Provincial Bylaws) (unpublished translation
on file with author) (explaining that in the Islamic Sharia tradition, there is no clear instruction on
how to collect zakat, making it reasonable for Muslims to pay through an agency or directly to the
needy); Salim, Sharia Bylaws, supra note 252, at 16.
258. Salim, Sharia Bylaws, supra note 252, at 16.
259. ASPINALL, supra note 247, at 210.
260. Id.
261. QANUN 11/2006 (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Provincial Bylaws) (unpublished transla-
tion on file with author); see Miller, Islamic Law, supra note 249.
262. See Miller, Islamic Law, supra note 249.
263. QANUN 12/2003 (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Provincial Bylaws) (unpublished transla-
tion on file with author).
264. QANUN 13/2003 (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Provincial Bylaws) (unpublished transla-
tion on file with author).
265. QANUN 14/2003 (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Provincial Bylaws) (unpublished transla-
tion on file with author).
266. Id. pmbl., at “Considering” § a.
267. Id. ch. VI, art. 16 (“Investigation and prosecution on violation against the prohibition of
khalwat shall be conducted in compliance with the applicable laws and regulations insofar as it is
not regulated by this bylaw.”) (emphasis added).
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is, regardless if one is a Muslim or not.268 The qanun prohibit citizens from
committing the proscribed acts and from “facilitat[ing] and/or protect[ing]”
anyone who commits the act.269
The Qanun Khalwat imposes an obligation on all people to prevent
improper relations between men and women and grounds its authority in the
“legally sinful” nature of khalwat.270 The Sharia police (wilayatul hisbah),
entrusted to enforce the Sharia-based law, are given broad authority to “su-
pervise, monitor and promote the implementation” of the qanun.271 Even
with the appointed wilayatul hisbah, all citizens have an obligation to file a
report when they are aware of a violation of the qanun.272 Failure to do so
could result in a violation under the aiding and abetting provision.273 Viola-
tion of the Qanun Khalwat, either directly or by abetting another, is punish-
able by public caning.274
Realizing the Qanun Khalwat lacked force of law, the Provincial Leg-
islature, in 2009, comprehensively overhauled the penal code to incorporate
Sharia.275 The 2009 qanun, Qanun Jinayah, brings into its fold regulations
for acts proscribed by Islamic law. These acts, called jarimah, include in-
toxication (khamar), gambling (maisir), being alone with someone of the
opposite sex to whom you are not married or related (khalwat), fornication
(ikhtilath), male and female homosexuality (liwath and musahaqah respec-
tively), adultery (zina), and accusing someone of adultery without produc-
ing the necessary four witnesses (qadzaf).276
The Qanun Jinayah explicitly applies to nearly all citizens or visitors
in Aceh. Chapter II, Article 4 states that the qanun applies to:
a) A Muslim who commits jarimah in Aceh;
b) A non-Muslim who commits jarimah in Aceh with the partici-
pation of a Muslim who voluntarily chooses to abide under
jinayat law; and
c) A non-Muslim who commits jarimah in Aceh that is not stipu-
lated under the Indonesian Penal Code or other provisions
outside the Penal Code, but stipulated under this bylaw.277
268. Id. ch. III, art. 5 (“Every person is prohibited to commit khalwat.”) (first emphasis ad-
ded); id. ch. III, art. 6 (“Every person or every group member of the society, or state apparatus and
business entity are prohibited to facilitate and/or to protect anyone who commits khalwat.”) (first
emphasis added); id. ch. III, art. 7 (“Every person, both individually and in groups, has the obliga-
tion to prevent khalwat from happening.”) (first emphasis added).
269. Id. ch. III, art. 6.
270. Id. ch. III, art. 4.
271. Id. ch. I, art. 1, § 11.
272. Id. ch. IV, art. 8, § 2.
273. Id. ch. III, art. 6.
274. Id. ch. VIII, art. 27.
275. QANUN _/2009 intro. (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Provincial Bylaws, Qanun Jinayat)
(unpublished translation on file with author).
276. Id. ch. II, art. 2 (requiring that an adultery allegation under Sharia be corroborated by at
least four eyewitnesses in order for the adulterers to be charged).
277. Id. ch. II, art. 4(a)–(c).
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The Qanun Jinayah requires competent authorities to enforce the regu-
lations. Competent authorities include the Police Chief of Aceh and any
other appointed authority, included the wilayatul hisbah.278 Although Aceh
is vested with the power to establish the wilayatul hisbah to monitor and
supervise Sharia implementation, the wilayatul hisbah have limited power
and authority, so they must rely on the assistance of other state officials.279
Aceh lacks authority to “employ and train state officials, such as police,
prosecutors, and judges, to implement and enforce those regulations.”280
The sanctions for violating the Qanun Jinayah are steep. Anyone who
aids another in committing jarimah shall be punished with the same sanc-
tions as the actual perpetrator.281 Someone who forces another to commit
jarimah will be punished twice as severely as an actual perpetrator.282 If
jarimah is committed due to the negligence of another, the negligent party
will be punished half as severely as the actual perpetrator.283 Depending on
the severity of the jarimah, and the frequency with which the perpetrator
has committed such acts, the sanctions include caning, fines, imprisonment,
seizure of personal possessions, revocation of licenses and rights, and
forced compensation.284
C. Religious Freedom Implications of Modern Sharia Qanun: Threats
to Society
The Indonesian Women’s Coalition reports that local governments
throughout Indonesia have enacted more than one hundred explicitly Sharia
ordinances—from requiring Islamic dress on Fridays in Padang, West Su-
matra, and banning public displays of affection in Tangerang Regency and
Banten Province, to enforcing Muslim tithing law in South Sulawesi and
denying government services to women not wearing a headscarf.285
Many reports indicate these regulations are not heavily enforced.286
Their mere existence, however, erodes the possibility of peaceful religious
pluralism and serves as potential legal tools by which Islamic radicals can
thwart moderate Islam and religious freedom in Indonesia. For example,
radicals in Aceh force women to wear jilbabs, terrorize alcohol vendors,
278. QANUN 14/2003 ch. 1, art. 1, § 17 (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Provincial Bylaws) (un-
published translation on file with author).
279. Id. ch. V, art. 13, § 2.
280. Arskal Salim, Politics, Criminal Justice and Islamisation in Aceh, in ISLAM, SYARI’AH
AND GOVERNANCE 5 (Univ. of Melbourne Law Sch., Background Paper Ser. No. 3, 2009) [herein-
after Salim, Islamisation in Aceh].
281. QANUN _/2009 ch. II, art. 5, § 1 (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Provincial Bylaws, Qanun
Jinayat) (unpublished translation on file with author).
282. QANUN _/2009 ch. II, art. 5, § 2 (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Provincial Bylaws, Qanun
Jinayat) (unpublished tanslation on file with author).
283. Id. ch. II, art. 5, § 3.
284. Id. ch. II, art. 6, § 2(a)–(f).
285. Indonesia Religious Freedom Report, supra note 71.
286. Id.
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attack night clubs, and threaten people with stoning if they do not cease
working or driving during prayer times.287
The khalwat bylaw promotes citizen arrest, which poses serious threats
for religious freedom.288 By encouraging citizens to report khalwat viola-
tions to the appropriate authorities, citizens are encouraged to spy on each
other and invade privacy. This lack of trust is poisonous; people are prohib-
ited from conducting themselves according to the dictates of their own con-
sciences even in the privacy of their homes, as the qanun makes them
fearful of retribution and punishment from the government.
The purpose of the khalwat bylaw is to prevent inappropriate sexual
conduct. By allowing the government to intervene and neighbors to intrude,
the Qanun Khalwat imposes top-down control instead of allowing individu-
als to determine appropriate boundaries for themselves. Additionally, it en-
courages citizens to report acts without verification, which breeds mistrust
and degrades social solidarity. For instance, without asking for clarification,
my neighbor may report me for having a male visitor he or she has never
before seen. Even if the man is a relative whom I cannot marry, I would be
subject to an investigation and possibly jailed or fined because the report
was filed, even though I would not be violating khalwat. At the very least, I
would be discouraged from having family visit.
Threats to women’s rights are in fact the reality in Aceh and other
areas where Sharia law is being enforced. The various qanun have restricted
women’s mobility and lead to mistaken arrests.289 A bill in West Sumatra
prohibited women from leaving their homes between 10 p.m. and 4 a.m. in
an attempt to eradicate “prostitution, abortion, pornography, and drug
abuse.”290 In the Tangerang municipality, one woman was mistakenly ar-
rested for prostitution when in fact she was waiting for a bus late at night
after leaving work.291 The woman spent three days in jail because she was
unable to afford the 30,000 rupiah fine.292 The Tangerang mayor refused to
repeal or amend the legislation, despite political abuses and false accusa-
tions, and, on appeal, the Supreme Court refused to invalidate the law on
procedural grounds because it had “passed through a democratic
process.”293
Such cases of mistaken arrests have a deleterious effect on women’s
livelihoods, keeping women indoors despite pressing needs, such as the
need to work in the absence of a husband who can provide financial sup-
287. Country Profiles: Indonesia, supra note 76, at 204.
288. QANUN 14/2003 ch. IV, art. 8, §§ 1–2 (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Provincial Bylaws)
(unpublished translation on file with author).
289. Salim, Sharia Bylaws, supra note 252, at 18.
290. Id. at 17.
291. Id.
292. Id.
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port.294 The existence of such bylaws also leads to unjustified accusations
of sexual looseness, especially as the laws do not “draw on the presumption
of innocence,” but instead make subjective opinion the primary evidence of
a Sharia violation.295 Even from an Islamic perspective, this result is highly
problematic, as the false accusation of sexual wrongdoing (qadhaf), particu-
larly as it pertains to women, is in itself a moral crime requiring physical
punishment.296
There is also the question of efficacy. If the goal of Sharia norms is to
achieve a more moral society, is it true that implementing Sharia through
positive law is the best way of achieving that, or is even effective in doing
so? As Arskal Salim notes in Politics, Criminal Justice and Islamisation in
Aceh, despite the Sharia court’s increasing jurisdiction, its jurisdiction re-
mains contested by adat authorities.297 The qanun lay out formal proce-
dures and sanctions for violations, yet these procedures and sanctions are
often countered by local leaders, who have their own idea—based on
Acehnese custom—of how to deal with violations more effectively.298 In
fact, the non-formal methods “frequently lead to effective resolution of dis-
putes.”299 Moreover, the qanun themselves stipulate that dispute resolution
should happen first at the village level, which suggests that the village level
authorities, which are not based on Sharia bylaws, are in some way more
important than the Sharia laws themselves.300 That is, disputants may enter
the resolution process at various levels, and it usually happens that they
enter at a point not including the Sharia courts.301
As such, if the local enforcement of adat norms is largely effective in
bringing about the sort of moral society that the Sharia bylaws are intended
to create, then what is the purpose of enacting Sharia bylaws? Perhaps more
importantly, if a moral society is the end goal, are there better ways to
attaining that goal than enforcing religious code? As discussed above,
Sharia enforcement creates a culture of impunity. Focusing law enforce-
ment on violent actors is a more effective means of achieving not just a
moral society but also greater public order. Looked at another way, empow-
ering citizens and law enforcement, or the wilayatul hisbah, to regulate peo-
ple’s religious practices, opens the door for abuse of power and greater
injustice, whereas social sanctions—like those imposed when local authori-
ties enforce adat norms—are far more effective in creating, and maintain-
ing, a moral, non-violent society.
294. Id. at 17.
295. Id. at 18.
296. Id.
297. Salim, Islamisation in Aceh, supra note 280, at 14.
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This fact is particularly important because, to avoid clashing with na-
tional regulations denying local authorities the right to regulate religious
matters, the bylaws “emphasize methods and measures to establish public
order within the society, rather than implement Islamic law itself.”302 That
is, regulation of public order cannot be considered in conflict with national
laws—as such, there is a lesser likelihood that bylaws will be annulled. If
the stated purpose of the bylaws is public order, then its effectiveness in
achieving such requires a closer look. As discussed above, there is substan-
tial evidence that such bylaws exacerbate disorder rather than resolve it.
D. Religious Freedom Implications of Modern Sharia Qanun:
Discrimination Against Non-Muslims
While the Qanun Jinayah on its face excludes some non-Muslims, its
ambiguities can be interpreted to hold accountable any person who commits
jarimah. Chapter II, Article 4 describes the scope of the qanun’s applica-
tion. Article 4(b) applies the qanun to every non-Muslim who voluntarily
chooses to abide by the jinayah bylaw or who commits jarimah in Aceh
with the participation of a Muslim. Article 4(c) applies the qanun to any
non-Muslim, so long as there is no other law regulating the proscribed act.
This provision is aimed at guaranteeing “legal certainty in the implementa-
tion and enforcement of Islamic Sharia values.”303 If another legal provi-
sion produces the same outcome with a non-Muslim, as would the Qanun
Jinayah, the moral order of the society is retained.
There is no provision in Chapter II, Article 4(c) requiring the non-
Muslim to voluntarily bind himself to Qanun Jinayah. When is a non-Mus-
lim voluntarily bound to the Qanun Jinayah? The qanun provides no way to
answer this question. Does this Article tacitly confer authority to presume a
non-Muslim has voluntarily bound himself to the qanun by his actions, or
perhaps by consenting to live or travel in Aceh? If a non-Muslim verbally
and publicly binds himself to the qanun, can he later denounce his adher-
ence to it? At what point is his adherence irrevocable? The Qanun Jinayah
provides no answer to these questions.
In practice, there are cases where non-Muslims have, for example,
chosen to have their crimes punished by caning—as prescribed by the
Qanun Jinayah—instead of imprisonment.304 The benefits of the former
punishment are that it is relatively quick, whereas an equivalent jail sen-
tence would be much longer. While such incidents are clear-cut examples of
302. Salim, Sharia Bylaws, supra note 252, at 13.
303. QANUN _/2009 intro. (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Provinvial Bylaws, Qanun Jinayat)
(unpublished translation on file with author).
304. During my visit to Aceh, Indonesia, I met with Alyasa Abubakr, one of the drafters of the
Sharia regulations, and he noted this preference for Sharia punishments on the part of non-
Muslims.
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voluntary adherence by non-Muslims to Sharia regulations, as described
above, the text of the Qanun is unclear, leaving it open to abuse.
E. Religious Freedom Implications of Modern Sharia Qanun:
Discrimination Against Muslims
It is unclear who is a Muslim under the qanun. The qanun are poorly
drafted and lack clarity and consistency with other laws,305 leaving no clear
indication of who is a Muslim and when, during the process of conversion,
one stops being Muslim. This is particularly relevant if the qanun are inter-
preted to apply differently to Muslims and non-Muslims. If such is the case,
people may insincerely follow the Islamic faith in order to avoid punish-
ment by the government, even though they privately no longer follow
Islam.
Chapter II, Article 4(a) unequivocally binds any Muslim who commits
jarimah in Aceh, regardless of his intent or his voluntary adherence to
jinayah. If the law is read to impose stricter standards on Muslims than non-
Muslims, it remains unclear what makes someone Muslim under the Qanun
Jinayah. Must he or she profess the shahada, or is being born into a Muslim
family sufficient? How strictly must he adhere to the teachings of Islam,
and which school of fiqh must he follow? What about Ahmadiyyas, who
consider themselves Muslim, when most Muslims disagree because the
Ahmadiyya deviate from traditional norms of Islam?306 Will the Ahmadiyya
be considered Muslim under the Qanun Jinayah? If so, who decides? What
about people who choose to be less devout and more secular, that is, so-
called “nominal Muslims”?
By giving itself the authority to answer these questions, the Provincial
Legislature of Aceh strips from its people the freedoms of belief, con-
science, and expression. The government appoints itself the primary arbiter
of faith, the ultimate authority on what “Islam” is and how Muslims are to
practice it. Varying interpretations are subsumed under one monolithic defi-
nition of the faith, and religiosity becomes subject to an external calcula-
tion, measured by the government in terms of how many and how well an
individual fulfils the rituals and sexual injunctions of the faith.
Implementing such qanun with the force of law also induces hypocrisy
rather than true belief. To practice Islam faithfully, one must embrace it
with one’s own will, rather than be coerced into fulfilling religious obliga-
tions. Otherwise one risks acting in hypocrisy, putting on a charade merely
to appear religious rather than truly living in accord with true faith. Given
the Quran’s strong condemnation of hypocrisy in belief, this likely by-prod-
305. Salim, Islamisation in Aceh, supra note 280, at 4.
306. For a discussion of the conflict between the majority of Muslims and the Ahmadiyya sect,
see supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text.
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uct of the Sharia qanun requires serious consideration.307 If the purpose of
the Sharia qanun is to strengthen the Islamic character of the Acehnese,
potentially inducing hypocrisy runs counter to the very purpose of the
qanun.
Part of the problem has to do with how “Islam” and “Islamic charac-
ter” are defined—are these intrinsically related to a quest for Truth, where a
Muslim evolves spiritually and interacts with his or her world in a way that
leads him or her closer to God? Or is Islam primarily viewed as a political
or social identity, something more external than internal, and thus more
easily subject to external regulation? The Sharia qanun, especially as they
relate to the Acehnese quest for political autonomy and the impulse to de-
fine Aceh as somehow different or “special,” appear to be rooted in the
latter definition of Islam. Moreover, many Acehnese citizens strictly ob-
served Sharia before the imposition of these qanun, which suggests—and is
supported by the earlier historical account—that the effort to translate
Sharia norms into positive law was motivated largely by social and political
needs, rather than religious ones.308 Sharia implementation raises serious
religious freedom concerns when it purports to justify Sharia qanun on the
basis of Divine displeasure and to regulate aspects of an individual’s private
relationship with God.
In politicizing religion, the state defines it according to its own inter-
ests. The fluidity of the Sharia concept lends itself well to such political
manipulation; despite the attempt to legislate aspects of Sharia, the meaning
of “Sharia” remains unclear. “[A]lthough every Muslim agrees that
shari’ah is the highest norm, and thus often attracts much support for its
implementation, there has never been a consensus among Muslims over
what exactly it entails. This particular situation has been identified as ‘soli-
darity without consensus.’”309 Some supporters of Sharia legislation argue
that Sharia covers all aspects of a Muslim’s life, and yet, the legislation
itself is quite limited and focuses not on general affairs but on very specific
religious obligations.310 In the end, then, what is regulated and what is not
is defined by state interests, which may include, among other things, the
state’s purported objective of maintaining public order, or its unarticulated
purpose of bolstering its own legitimacy and demonstrating its loyalty to
Acehnese identity.311 Given state control, the definition of “Sharia” and of
“Islam” inevitably becomes primarily a question of political expediency
rather than a genuine spiritual endeavour.
307. THE HOLY QUR’AN, Sura Qasas 63:1–7 (Abdullah Yusaf Ali trans., 2d U.S. ed. 1988).
308. McGibbon, supra note 87, at 333.
309. Salim, Sharia Bylaws, supra note 252, at 13.
310. Id.
311. ASPINALL, supra note 247, at 211.
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F. Islam, Secularism, and Religious Freedom
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, in his recent book Islam and the Secular
State,312 forcefully argues that within the context of the modern nation-
state, state-enforced Sharia and religious freedom are incompatible:
In order to be a Muslim by conviction and free choice, which is
the only way one can be a Muslim, I need a secular state. By a
secular state I mean one that is neutral regarding religious doc-
trine, one that does not claim or pretend to enforce Shari’a—the
religious law of Islam—simply because compliance with Shari’a
cannot be coerced by fear of state institutions or faked to appease
their officials.313
While the phrase “secular state” rings of European colonialism and Western
imperialism for many Muslims,314 An-Na’im defines a secular state as
“neutral regarding religious doctrine.”315 He argues that to be freely Mus-
lim, one must avoid a potentially fallacious state-imposed religion; the state
must be secular. Neutrality requires the state facilitate the possibility of re-
ligious devotion, without mandating or enforcing it.316 Although the state
must be secular, society should not be. An-Na’im argues that citizens
should influence public policy and enact legislation that reflects Sharia
principles, so long as democratic concepts are preserved: citizens must use
civic reason (that is, secular, not religious, arguments) and honor “constitu-
tional and human rights safeguards.”317 This active political role on the part
of religious citizens is particularly important in religious societies where
individuals need moral, even if not religious, justification for a given law or
action.
An-Na’im explains that politics links the two separate but complimen-
tary functions of religion and state. In the modern nation-state where the
constitutional form of government guarantees certain basic human rights,
the political sovereign protects freedom and promotes the common good by
maintaining peace, regulating the economy, and providing defense against
invasion.318 The political authority of the state has coercive and exclusive
power over territories and populations.319 Political authority is gained by
demonstrating on the macro level one’s ability to effectively use coercion to
administer the state for the good of the entire society and not a preferred
class.320 In contrast, religion is designed to regulate moral conduct and pro-
312. AN-NA’IM, supra note 245.
313. Id. at 1.
314. Id. at 260.
315. Id. at 1.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 261.
318. Id. at 49.
319. Id. at 50–51.
320. Id. at 50.
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vide a mode of worship.321 Religious authority is gained on the micro level
by developing personal relationships, earning confidence of one’s followers
through consistent piety, and demonstrating extensive knowledge of
religion.322
For An-Na’im, freedom from coercion is the keystone for freely prac-
ticing one’s religion. With only freedom to believe, but without freedom to
worship, citizens are relegated to internalizing their prayers, religious life,
and acts of piety. For a Muslim, prayer is a physical and mental act. Mus-
lims recite their daily prayers while moving through prayerful positions
with their bodies—from prostrating to kneeling to standing. Muslims, par-
ticularly male Muslims, are encouraged to perform their daily prayers in
congregation, which implicates other aspects of religious freedom, such as
the freedom to express religious belief in public and in community. Without
religious freedom, a Muslim would be unable to do what Islam requires of
him or her.
As An-Na’im discusses in his chapter on Indonesia, such restrictions
on freedom of worship and religious expression exist in Indonesia. The
Ministry of Religion recognizes only six official religions, effectively ostra-
cizing many tribal religions that were practiced by Indonesians before any
of the six official religions were brought to the region.323 Pancasila’s mon-
otheism requirement provides law enforcement with a stick to use against
atheists and polytheists.324 The Ministry of Education, instead of the Minis-
try of Religion, dictates the parameters of the unofficial religions, including
forcing adherents “to choose one of the officially recognized religions for
the national identity cards.”325 Unofficial rituals of marriage and death are
also outlawed, compelling adherents to follow instead the ceremonial tradi-
tions of a recognized religion.326 These acts are coercive and cut against the
freedom of religion, which includes the right of opinion, expression, and
belief, as articulated in numerous international instruments ratified by—and
thus binding upon—Indonesia.
Similar problems arise when translating Sharia norms into positive law
in the context of the modern nation-state. An-Na’im argues that because of
the various, reasonable interpretations of Sharia, freedom from coercion
along with the freedoms of opinion, expression, and belief are necessary to
work out the possible conceptions of Sharia.327 Humans must interpret
Sharia in order to apply it to their daily lives. It exists at a high level of
abstraction that is neither “distinctly Islamic nor sufficiently specific for the
321. Id. at 51.
322. Id.
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purposes of public policy and legislation.”328 Human interpretation gives
rise to fallibility, which is evidenced by the four schools of fiqh: Hanafi,
Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali. Among these four, there are various ways of
reading Quranic injunctions or interpreting the Prophet’s Sunna. Despite the
fallibility of human interpretation and the diversity of valid opinions, when
Sharia is translated into positive law and “a principle or norm is officially
identified as ‘decreed by God,’ it is extremely difficult for believers to resist
or change its application in practice.”329
According to An-Na’im, the Islamic state under the Sharia regime is
not possible in the modern democratic state. When the state controls the
implementation of Sharia, it invariably elevates one interpretation of Sharia
above another, potentially equally reasonable interpretation. Whatever the
state enforces under political power is a product of coercive authority and
not superior religious authority.330 Every Muslim has a “permanent and in-
escapable responsibility” to know and uphold Sharia.331 When an institu-
tion—the state—and not a practicing Muslim makes the decision on which
of the many interpretations of Sharia will be enforced, the duty to know and
uphold Sharia is abdicated. An-Na’im, as such, asserts that Muslims must
accept a secular state as a function of their religious obligations. That is,
An-Na’im holds that “Muslims will reform non-conforming Islamic doc-
trines sufficiently so that for their own Islamic reasons they would respect
the state’s religious neutrality.”332
An-Na’im’s reasons for asserting that Muslims must accept a secular
state as a function of their religious obligations can be summarized as fol-
lows: First, “adherence to Islam must be voluntary in order for it to be
Islamically normative, and . . . only a state that is neutral with respect to
religion can guarantee the background conditions of a free and voluntary
acceptance of Islam.”333 As described above, by penalizing religious diso-
bedience, the state corrupts that voluntariness and forces the individual to
follow God’s law—not because God requires it of him, but because the
state does; the state’s role thus induces hypocrisy. Second, “the idea of an
Islamic state—to the extent it is understood to be a state that applies the
Shari’a on the theory that it is God’s law—is rationally incoherent” because
“human beings do not have direct access to the Shari’a’s rules.”334 Thus,
the Sharia being applied is in fact a product of human interpretation and
inevitably leads to disagreements about the “precise contents of the
328. Id. at 37.
329. Id. at 28.
330. Id. at 7.
331. Id. at 14.
332. Mohammad Fadel, Islamic Politics And Secular Politics: Can They Co-Exist?, 25 J.L. &
RELIGION 187, 196 (2009–2010) (book review).
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Shari’a.”335 In the end, then, what is being applied is not Sharia but what a
particular government decides is Sharia.336 Third, the idea of an Islamic
State does not have historical legitimacy because “even before the colonial
interregnum in the Islamic world Muslims did not establish governments in
which religion and state were fused.”337 Politicians who managed the af-
fairs of Muslim states consulted as needed with “religious scholars regard-
ing the role of the Shari’a in the state’s governance.”338
This last argument is supported by Noah Feldman’s explanation in The
Fall and Rise of the Islamic State that the rulers in classical Sunni Islam
never claimed religious legitimacy except to the extent they were legiti-
mized by the independent scholar class, which served as a check on the
abuse of power.339 If the ruler acted outside his bounds or otherwise com-
mitted an act of injustice, the ulama could strip him of his legitimacy by
declaring that his actions contravene God’s law.340
[A] basically orthodox ruler could be tolerated even if he made
theological or other errors; so long as the shari’a was followed,
scholars should reprimand him and bring him to correct views.
But with true infidels—taken to include those who failed to apply
the shari’a—there could be no compromise.341
The precise ruler-ulama relationship described by Feldman is seen in
the history of Aceh.342 During the Sultanate, the ulama were loyal to the
sultan only if they believed the sultan faithfully adhered to the precepts of
Islam.343 The sultan was dependent on the ulama insofar as it was the
ulama who legitimized the ruler; the ulama had the power to dethrone the
sultan and in fact did in the case of Sultan Jauhar al-Alam, as described
above.344 After Dutch colonization and under Suharto, the ulama were un-
dermined and they lost their influence and internal unity. Even with the
creation of MPU, which strengthened ulama in the public square, they re-
main fragmented.345
In modern-day Aceh, the architects of the current Sharia bylaws claim
explicitly in their literature that Sharia is not new to Aceh—that is, Sharia
was applied during the Sultanate.346 What this explanation overlooks, how-
ever, is the different nature of the legal structure between the Sultanate era
335. Id. at 198.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 200.
338. Id. at 200–01.
339. NOAH FELDMAN, THE FALL AND RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 29 (2008).
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342. See supra Part II.
343. See supra Part II.B.
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and present-day Aceh, including most fundamentally the role and influence
of the ulama and their precise relationship with the ruler. Modern day
Sharia implementation gives the ruler both religious and political authority,
thus removing checks on power and inevitably leading to the type of au-
thoritarianism evident in many parts of the Muslim world. Whereas in
classical times Sharia was seen as a limit on state power, in the modern
context, it enlarges that power and allows the state to regulate the public
expression of religion in a way that best suits the state’s interest. “Islam”
thus serves the state, rather than the state serving Islam.
Other fundamental differences between classical Islamic society and
modern Muslim-majority nation-states are globalization and increasing re-
ligious diversity. Whereas in classical Islamic society, political and relig-
ious identity was one and the same, “most Muslims today have moved away
from this conjunction between religious community and political identity to
a separation between the two . . . [and] most nation-states in the world,
including the Muslim world, are [no longer] based on this strict identifica-
tion.”347 Some scholars therefore contend that many classical Islamic rul-
ings, such as those prescribing death for apostasy—then considered an act
of treason because of the melding of religious and political identities—are
no longer applicable.348 Thus, it is not just the procedural and political as-
pects of implementing Sharia but also the substance of Sharia that is deeply
affected by changing social circumstances. Attempting to implement Sharia
without accounting for these changed circumstances arguably brings into
question the religious legitimacy of the project.
G. Arguing for Secularism from Within Islamic Tradition: A Critique of
Islam and the Secular State
In Islamic Politics and Secular Politics: Can They Co-Exist?, Moham-
mad Fadel argues that there are serious Islamic objections to An-Na’im’s
stated reasons for asserting that Muslims must accept a secular state as a
function of their religious obligations.349 These objections need to be ad-
dressed if An-Na’im’s arguments are to be accepted by orthodox Muslims.
Although An-Na’im claims that he seeks to argue from within the Is-
lamic tradition, he is not taking an exegetical approach in doing so and is
thus not interpreting traditional Islamic texts. Instead, he seeks to provide a
“new interpretative framework” for future analysis of Islam and secularism.
It is precisely this lack of engagement with the traditional texts that, accord-
347. ABDULLAH SAEED & HASSAN SAAEED, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, APOSTASY, AND ISLAM
169 (2008).
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ing to his critics, becomes the Achilles’ heel of his arguments.350 To that
end, Fadel provides some examples of what may serve as a traditionalist
response to An-Na’im’s arguments, then goes on to explain how An-Na’im
may use traditional resources to bolster his argument.
With respect to An-Na’im’s view on voluntariness, Fadel agrees that
such is required by traditional Islamic scholarship on the issue of conver-
sion to Islam. These same traditional teachings, however, would not neces-
sarily extend the voluntariness requirement to other actions and “could very
well argue that coercive application of Islamic law is rightful because the
act of accepting the truth of Islam, by necessary implication, also entails
acceptance of the rightness of its rules.”351 Punishing a Muslim’s failure to
comply with a given Sharia-based rule would be consistent with his moral
integrity because the lack of compliance would be against the Muslim’s
own moral convictions.352 The failure to comply does not reflect his lack of
belief that the action is wrong; it merely reflects a present inability to abide
by his conviction.353 Fadel agrees, however, that forcing a non-Muslim to
comply with Islamic rulings would be against his moral integrity, as the
non-Muslim has not accepted the truth of Islam. Traditional teachings thus
hold that Islamic rulings do not apply to non-Muslims.354
Regarding An-Na’im’s argument that the idea of an Islamic state is
rationally incoherent because humans do not have direct access to the
Sharia rules, and thus what eventually comes to be implemented are not
divine rules but human ones—“at the critical point of enforcement politics
does the work, not religious truth”355—Fadel argues that An-Na’im over-
looks “traditional Islamic distinctions” between aspects of the Sharia that
can be known without legal interpretation (“e.g., the sinfulness of drinking
grape wine or engaging in fornication”) and those that do require legal
skills (“e.g., whether drinking intoxicating beverages other than grape wine
is also sinful”).356 The former rulings are based on unequivocal texts, and
the latter on equivocal texts; that is, they involve those issues that do not
have clear textual answers and require speculation.357 Whereas An-Na’im’s
argument is relevant to equivocal texts, which require human interpretation,
it is irrelevant with respect to the unequivocal ones.
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It appears likely, then, that An-Na’im is asserting that any aspect of the
Sharia that may be considered legal “in the modern sense of the term”
would require analysis of the equivocal texts. As Fadel notes, such a posi-
tion “assumes that the only coherent sense in which the Shari’a could be
applied is in situations where its application does not require any human
judgment.”358 Sunni Muslims, however, reject such a position, and hold that
religious obligations may arise from reason or interpretation of the texts or
simply concluding, on the basis of the “preponderance of the evidence,”
that a given act or omission is morally required. The fact that the obligation
is based on equivocal rather than unequivocal texts is relevant only to the
extent that dissent is tolerated—it is tolerated only in the case of equivocal
texts.359
Fadel goes on to argue that, even in cases where dissent is tolerated, it
is still acceptable for a Sharia judge who is overseeing a dispute among two
Muslims to resolve the case in accordance with the Shari’a:
If all the Shari’a requires is that the dispute be resolved using
revelatory sources rather than a particular or substantively “cor-
rect” interpretation of those sources then the judge can be fairly
said to have applied the Shari’a to resolve the dispute to the ex-
tent she applies those sources to the facts at hand in good faith
and with integrity.360
A similar analysis would be applied to prospective rules legislated in
accordance with the Sharia, except that unlike judicial judgments, they
would be called “acts of state” (tasarruf bi-l-imama), and would be open to
revision by future Islamic governments within the “limits of Islamic
legality.”361
In pre-modern Islam, when Muslims would dissent from such prospec-
tive laws, they would have the ability to opt-out, but only when compliance
with the law would require them to sin.362 The obligation to obey the gov-
ernment’s rule arose not from the idea that the government’s interpretation
of Sharia was correct simply by virtue of it being the government’s inter-
pretation, but from the Sharia principle of a “duty to obey lawful commands
of the government so long as obedience does not entail sin.”363 Fadel thus
holds that An-Na’im’s position completely misses the mark in terms of
what is considered a legitimate Islamic ruling under the traditional concep-
tions—a ruling that is based on an unequivocal text or is derived from an
equivocal text in an ethical manner holds the authority of the Sharia.364
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As for An-Na’im’s historical argument about Islamic states, Fadel ex-
plains that the lack of an historical Islamic state does not somehow evi-
dence that one should never exist.365 “[R]aw experience is not normative
absent some normative theory that makes history morally significant.”366 In
the Shi’i Muslim context, the argument would also not hold any weight
given the Shi’i belief in the divinely-inspired imam-ruler who holds relig-
ious legitimacy with or without the scholar class; such a conception of the
imam-ruler defies any notions of the separation of church and state.367
In critiquing An-Na’im’s arguments, Fadel makes the important point
that Muslims have a “long tradition of theological, ethical and legal reason-
ing” that they will not forget nor overlook when analyzing An-Na’im’s ar-
guments for a secular state. To best win over orthodox Muslims, therefore,
it is important to “tap into the resources of this tradition.”368
One such traditional resource is the idea that careful readings and
human experiences can produce multiple meanings and interpretations of
Islamic texts.369 Traditional legal scholars of Islam held that the plain
meaning of the text should be enforced unless a “sufficiently strong coun-
tervailing factor is identified.”370 Countervailing factors may be rational or
experiential; changing social circumstances also affect the way a text is
interpreted.371 There are established legal principles, for instance, that hold
that even where a rule is based on explicit revelation, it may be revised if
changing social norms requires it.372
An-Na’im’s advocacy of a secular state is also supported by the Sunni
position “that the state should not be thought of as a divine instrumental-
ity.”373 Some Sunni scholars even go further than An-Na’im in claiming
that the Prophet Muhammad did not fuse religion and politics but instead
was divinely-inspired only when acting as a prophet and was otherwise
wholly secular when dealing with matters of state.374
IV. CONCLUSION
Sharia implementation in Aceh is best understood within a framework
informed by An-Na’im’s arguments about the viability of a secular state
premised on Islamic principles, especially as those arguments are strength-
ened by Fadel’s critiques. Such a framework is rooted in both traditional
Islamic notions of human rights and prevailing international law on the
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freedom of religion, belief, conscience, and expression, which together
challenge the underpinnings of the Sharia implementation project. To the
extent that this project is couched in public order terminology or promoted
as a means of increasing religiosity among Aceh’s Muslims, an analysis of
the law as actually formulated and applied suggests that these aims are far
from being served.
